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P R E F A C E 
The present study entitled, The Principle of 
Kernalism and the Modernization of the Turkish Republic, is, 
in fact, a study of the achievements of Mustafa Kemal, more 
popular as Atatlirk, who was a revolutionary and dynamic 
personality among the twentieth century reformers. His 
role in the modernizing Turkey cannot, infact, be separated 
from his role in building the Republic of Turkey. Atatiirk's 
achievements in founding a Modern Turkish State deserves 
special emphasis. Inspite of many books that have been 
published on the personality, military achievements, and 
reforms of Ataturk.Not much mere has been written on the Principles 
of Kemalism' . So the selection of this topic and the 
resultant attempt to collect the scattered materials from 
the different sources. 
Mustafa Kemal has been credited with the carrying 
out of an independent Turkish Republic out of the ruins of 
the once great Ottoman Empire after World War I. On 
becoming the President of the newly formed Republic of 
Turkey he introduced certain drastic reforms in the 
religious, social, cultural, political, economic and almost 
all the fields in order to improve the lot of his people. 
This dissertation is spread over eight chapters 
apart from my own conclusions. In the introductory part the 
11 
period from the Tanzimat to the Youny Turks has been 
discussed, since, it was in this period in which certain 
modernizing reforms were introduced by the Ottoman Sultans 
culminating in the grant of the first constitution. 
Chapter-II concern mainly the cause of the War for 
Liberation and Establishment of the Turkish Republic after 
the defeat and break-up of the Ottoman Empire in World War I. 
Chapter - III, IV, V, VI, VII and VIII based on the 
six principles of Kemalism like Republicanism, Nationalism, 
Populism, Secularism, Etatism and Revolutionism in that 
order. These were the many reforms of Mustafa Kemal dealt 
v?ith at length. These reforms concerned the politics, 
religion, language, education, religious law, economic and 
foreign policies, banking, industry, agriculture and land. 
Lastly, I wish to express my grateful thanks to my 
supervisor Dr. Sayyid Ahsan, Reader, Department of Islamic 
Studies, whose able guidance has been of great value in the 
preparation and compilation of this work. My thanks are 
also due to the Chairman of the Department, Prof. Azddudin 
Khan and other teachers of the Department, especially 
Dr. Ahsanul Haq, for his kind assistance and encouragement. 
I would also like to express my gratitutde to my 
parents ; brothers, Shakil Ahmed, Altaf, Faisal, Imran, Arif; 
sisters, Shaista, Ayesha, Kishwar; fellow scholars in the 
Department viz Mr. Adam Malik Khan, Mr. Mushtaq Ahmad Wani, 
Ill 
Mr.. Bllal Ahmad, Ms. Shabnam Begum, Ms. Shabnam Perveen, 
Ms. Farzana Samdani, Ms. Saima Zaidi, Miss Gazala Yasmeen, 
Gazanfer Ali and friends, Mohammad Husain, Azher Baig, Asif 
Ahmad Khan, Shahid Meer, Haseen Ahmad and Nisbah Farooqi. 
I would fail in my duty if I do not express my 
special thanks to the Library Staff, Department of Islamic 
Studies, especially Mr. Kabir Ahmad Khan, for the facilities 
provided to me and to Mr. S. Masahab Ali for typing the 
manuscript within a short span of time. In the end, I must 
admit, the deficiencies, if any, are all mine. 
(AIJAZ AHMED) 
CHAPTER - I 
TANZIMAT (1839-78) 
in the past 200 years the history of Middle East has 
largely been a reaction of the governments and people of the 
region to the challenges of western civilization. These 
challenges have been political, social, religious, economic, 
literary, and artistic. The encounter with western 
civilization has created two types of revolutions for the 
people of the era - the revolution for independence and the 
revolution for change. Unlike the Arab World, Turkey has 
never been ruled by any European power therefore the 
revolution for independence was never applied to them but 
revolution for change did. In the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries the Ottomans were forced to give up what they had 
acquired during the earlier centuries. 
Repeated defeats inflicted by the Russians, together 
with Nepoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798, compelled the 
Turks to reflect upon their weaknesses and backwardness. 
Selim III (1789-1808) was the first sultan to attempt to 
transform his empire along western lines rather than to try 
1. Yahya Armajani and T.M. Ricks, Middle East Past and 
Present( New Jersey, 1986), p. 166. 
CO 90 back to the good old days of Sulaiman the Maynificent 
2 
(1520 - 1566). Selim failed because of the opposition of 
military and religious vested interest,, the janissaries, and 
the ulema. His successor, Mahmud II (1808-1839), was more 
3 
successful, as he managed to wipe-out the Janissaries and 
to assert his authority over the hitherto insubordinate 
local potentates. Mahmud did not transform his empire, but 
he did clear the ground for later reformers by removing two 
great obstacles to change - the Janissaries and the 
4 
provincial lords. 
Sultan Abdiil Hamit I (1774-1808) was the first to 
concieve of the weakness of the Ottoman Empire. In order to 
stem the rot he, in 1774, invited European experts and 
artisans to train the Turkish army. The attempts at reforms 
were continued by Sultan Selim III (1789-1808), who was an 
2. Sulayman I (1520-66) was known to his people by the 
honorific title of al-Qanuni (the law-giver) while 
Europeans called him the Magnificent. Most of the 
North African conquests were achieved during his 
reign. Hungary,.Vienna and Rhodes was also besieged. 
(For more on this, consult S. Lane-Poole, The Story 
of the Barbary Corsairs, (New York, 1891). 
3. Murat I began to organize a new military force 
composed of "Slaves of the Porte". These men came to 
the ruler as his pencik, or one-fifth share, of 
booty captured from the enemy. When these youths 
came to the Sultan, they were educated in Turkish 
language, Islam, Arabic and other characteristics of 
the Ottoman way. Then they were given military 
training and organized as infantry called Yeni Ceri 
("New Force"), or Janissary Corps or as Cavalry, 
called Sipahis.S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw, History of 
the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, " (Cambridge, 
1976), Vol.1, p.26. 
4. L.S. Stavrians, ed.,. The Ottoman Empire. (New York, 
1959), p.40. 
ardent admirer of the French Revolution, and after him by 
Sultan Mahmut II (1808-1839). Finally, it was Sultan Abdul 
Mecit (1839-1861) who made the reforms felt. This era of 
reforms in the history of the Ottoman Empire came to be 
5 
known as the period of Tanzimat. 
The changes made within the Empire cannot be 
measured solely in terms of the amount of prodding from 
European powers. 
Tanzimat was the second phase of Ottoman reforms 
begun consciously to re-create the state and wanted to 
7 
amalgamate East and West. The people who were most 
attached to the idea of Tanzimat that introduced the idea of 
individual freedom, with an almost religious fervour, were 
g 
especially, the youth among the Turks. Tanzimat reforms 
gave the idea of state Nationalism and democracy. The 
reformists took up democracy and the non-muslims took up 
Nationalism which was emphasised throughout the country, and 
non-foreign powers, especially Russia, saw to it that the 
9 
Tanzimat did not bring about a Union. 
5. Tanzimat, 'Regulation' is the name given to the 
programme of reforms that was inaugurated in 
November 1839. Its architect was Mustafa Re^it 
Pasa. The term "Tanzimat" derived from the root 
meaning "Order". 
6. Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
7. Halide Edib, Conflict of East and West in Turkey 
(New Delhi,1935), p,67. 
8. Ibid , p.77. 
9. Ibid , p.68-70. 
To begin with, the growth of European influence 
helped check the disintegration of the Empire. Fear of, as 
well as pressure from, Europe, gave the Ottoman government 
an incentive to reform itself : the new military and 
administrative methods gave it the instrument of reform 
brought about by a combination between a reforming Sultan 
and some high officials with a direct knowledge of Europe. 
Its aim was, first of all, to create a modern army, then to 
use it to restore the powers of the central government over 
the provinces, and to create a new framework of centralized 
administration and secular law. 
But the process of reform contained in itself weakness 
and contradictions which were to carry disintegration to its 
logical end. The reforming combination itslef was a fragile 
one - a Sultan who wanted absolute power and a bureaucracy 
which wanted power restrained by principles and 
regulations- and this inevitably they splitted towards the 
end of the century. 
12 
Mahmut II (1808-1839) died while Ibrahim's army was 
invading Anatolia. He was succeeded by his younger son. 
10. Kanal . H. Karpat, The Ottoran State and It's place in 
World History (Leiden, EJ. Brill, 1974), p.73. 
11. Ibid , p.74. 
12. Ibrahim was succeeded by his father Mehmet Ali» in 
1848. He conquired Syria in 1831 and had led 
successful campaigns against Wahhabis from 1816 to 
1818. 
Abdill Mecit (1839-1861). The guiding genius of the early 
13 Tanzimat was Mehmut's foreign minister, Mustafa Resit Pasa, 
who happened to be in London seeking British aid against 
14 Mehmet Ali at the time Abdul Mecit took over. Advised by 
the British and Resit Pasa, the new sultan issued a 
proclamation called the Noble Rescript of the Rose Chamber 
15 (Hatt-i Serif of Gulhane) in which the sultan announced 
that he wished the honour and property of all his subjects 
to be secure that the tax-farming would be abolished and the 
recruiting for the army would be done in a more regular 
fashion, all criminals would be tried in public and all 
subjects, of whatever religion, would be considered equal 
before the law. 
13. Mustafa Resit, born in 1800 in Istanbul, was a 
well-read and far-sighted statesman, who had served 
as Ottoman Ambassador to Paris and was anxious to 
save his country from the doom that had overtaken 
the French monarchy. 
14. Mehmet Ali (1805-48) was the most famous modernizer 
in nineteenth century Middle Eastern history. He 
remain as an Ottoman Governor of Egypt from 1805 to 
1848 and founder of the dynasty that was to rule the 
country for over a century. He was known as the 
leader of Albanian and Bosnian soldier. 
15. Goldschmidt Jr. Arthur, A Concise History of the 
Middle East (London, 1988), p. 165. 
16. Mazheruddin Siddiqui, Development of Islamic State 
and Society (Islamabad,, 1956), p.243. 
The document ordered that a commission be appointed 
to draw up laws giving effect to this principle. The main 
point of the reforms may be summarized as follows : all 
legal process hence forward to be conducted publicly, all 
citizens to have the right to dispose freely of moveable and 
immoveable property, and all citizens to be assured of 
security of life and protection of honour and possessions, 
a reform of military system was also announced. The new laws 
would be promulgated by the Sultan with effect from "so long 
as God has willed". Then followed a noteworthy avowal of 
their purpose, which was "to impart new strength to the 
religion, state, country and people". Bribery and 
corruption were to be curbed by the grant of adequate and 
regular salaries of all the officials. All this would 
necessitate financial and administrative reforms (such as 
abolition of tax-farming) in addition to reform of the 
judicial system. 
In fact Resit Pasa, by drawing up the charter, had 
served the dual purpose of satisfying the European powers, 
whose intervention in the domestic affairs of Turkey had 
become more and more serious (solution of Greek crisis 
agreement with Mahmet Ali) and to re-establish confidence 
17. H. Scheel, "The Ottoman History from 1774 to 1918", 
in Neuzeit the Geschichte det Islamischen 
Lander Part III translated and ed . by F.R.C. 
Bagley^ Leiden,E.J. Bril, 1959), P. 12-13. 
18 in the home yovernment. To carry out these promises which 
were revolutionary for the Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Re^it 
Pasa had an entourage of young and able officials who 
believed that liberal reforms would save the Ottoman 
,. • 19 
Empire. 
In addition to being a sincere reformer Resit was 
also a good politician and an opportunist. He recognized 
talents in others and raised up a group of disciples among 
20 21 
whom All Pasa and Fuat Pasa become the most prominent, 
18. EI (I), Vol. VIII/ p.fi5^ . 
19. Goldschmidt Jr. Arthur, Op. Cit , p.165. 
20. Full name was Mehmet Emin Ali Pasa (1815-1871), son 
of an Istanbul shopkeeper. He started his education 
as a medrese student. He transferred into the newly 
developed scribal service of the Porte on 
September 1, 1830. He learned French in the trans-
lation office and rose in its service, going as a 
junior clerk on missions to Vienna (1835-1836). He 
was Refit's personal scribe and translator during 
the latter's embassy to London. He served as 
ambassador to London from 1841 to 1844, and foreign 
minister two times (1846-1848) and (1848-1852). He 
remained as a member of the principal legislative 
body of that time and supreme council of Judicial 
Ordinances Meclisi Vala-yi Ahkam - i Adliye). 
21. Kececizade Mehmet Fuat Pasa (1815-1869) was from an 
Ulema family and received Medrese education. 
Without his family support he studied in Medical 
School (Tibhane-i Amire). He knew French and 
became the Scribe to Tahir Pasa, governor of Tunis, 
from 1832 to 1836. He entered his service only in 
1837. He rose to become first translator of the 
porte. He also served as a foreign minister for two 
years from 1858 to 1860. 
but he wanted to keep the direction of affairs in his own 
22 
hands. 
The Hatt-i-Serif was all the more important since 
through it for the first time equality among the Ottoman 
subjects was declared to be the official policy in the 
words : "These imperial concessions are extended to all 
23 
our subjects of whatever religion or sect, they may be." 
The more specific transformation, consequently, was 
affected in legal matters in which a revised secular penal 
code was adopted, in education, when secular education was 
incorporated, and in military where non-Muslims could now be 
enlisted. In addition, representation of non-Muslim 
24 
millets to provincial meclis or council of the governor 
25 
made the promises of the Hatt-"i Serif more realistic. 
The Giilhane Charter proved to be a short lived 
success since the millets expected more than what it 
22. R.H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, (New 
Jersey, 1963), p.37. 
23. Ibid., p.40. 
24. Jews, Christian, Armenian, Albanian and Greek were 
considered in non-muslim millet. They were given 
more righted To encompass all the segment of the 
society. Millet was replaced by Osmanlilik 
(Ottoman ism). 
25. Ibid , p.44. 
76 delivered. The Chater, in effect, limited the power of 
the sultan who now became bound by constitutional provisions 
in accordance with the charter. The first changes were 
affected in the field of commercial laws which fell outside 
the Seyriat when in 1850 secular laws were framed dealing 
27 
with trade and commerce. In the system of judiciary 
certain modifications were made when a new penal code was 
framed in phases in 1840, 1851 and finally in 1858. These 
new laws were under the Ministry of Justice and were applied 
in secular courts which existed simultaneously with the 
Sharia courts which were under the Seyhiil Islam. < 
On the whole the Tanzimat were carried out in an 
uncertain and troubled atmosphere in which the grand vizir 
29 
was changed as quickly as he returned to power. There 
were also periods when foreign intervention called for new 
efforts. This was the case with the deliberation which 
30 preceded the peace conference in Pans. Turkey's allies 
26. Goldschmidth Jr. Arthur, Op, Cit., p. 165. 
27. Niyazi Berkes, Development of Secularism in Turkey 
(Montreal 1964), p.162. 
28. Ibid , p.165. 
29. Resit Pa^a was no less than six times grand vizir 
between 1846 and 1858 although the Sultan Abdii} Mecit 
was rather in favour of the reforms. The same 
changes in office took place under Abdii Aziz, much 
more capricious than his predecessor; Midhat Pa^a 
was grand vizir for three weeks in 1873 and for the 
second time for seven weeks (December 19, 1876 -
February 5, 1877), E.I. (J) Vol. IV, p. 657. 
30. For details see H.W.V. Temperley ed. A History of 
the Peace Conference of Paris. Vol.VI (London,1924), 
pp.1- 80. See also Chapter II below. 
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then wanted the Sultan to bind himself by an international 
agreement to carry out the reforms, which were still in 
31 abeyance. All the signatories of the treaty of Pans 
assumed an obligation to protect the Sultan's Christian 
subjects, and to that extent the Porte was placed under the 
tutelage of the European powers. To save Ottoman 
independence in this situation, the Sultan issued a new 
decree, the Hatt-i Humayun (Noble Script) of February 18, 
1856, reaffirming the promise which he had already given in 
32 1839. The Hatt-i Humayun was basically a reaffirmation 
of the earlier Charter of 1839, it went even further by 
assuring non-Muslims of religious liberty and equality in 
the administration of justice, taxation, public employment 
and military service as well as admission to the civil and 
33 
military school. The Hatt-i Humayun ignored the rising 
tide of nationalism among non-Muslims and failed to 
appreciate the effects of reforms based upon the millet 
34 
system. 
31. M. Siddiqu, op.cit, p.244. 
32. H. Scheel, "The Ottoman History from 1774 to 1918', 
p.15. 
33. Alford Bon, State and Economic in Middle East 
(London, 1955), p.13. 
34. Sydney Nettleton Fisher, The Middle East ; A 
History (London, 1971), p.319. 
11 
In June 186 5 the society of New Ottomans was formed 
secretly in Istanbul. Most of its members were men of 
influence. The main aim of the society was to transform the 
government into a constitutional monarchy. The society was 
banned in 1872 but its members continued to work for a 
constitutional regime. They saw the reward of their efforts, 
short lived though it proved to be, in 1876, when Abdul 
35 Aziz (1861-1876) was deposed. After his deposition 
sultan Murat V ( '_ 1876) was installed on the throne of 
'Hirkey. He survived only three months and three days when 
Abdifl Harait (1876-1909) with the help of Midhat Pap 
(1822-84) dethroned him promising to Midhat that he would 
call the representatives of the nations to constitute the 
Imperial Ottoman Parliament. 
At that time Turkey had few outstanding men who 
were capable of carrying out the reforms on a big scale. The 
Turkish statesman Midhat Pasa (1822-84), who had already 
distinguished himself by dealing with difficult task in the 
provinces, laid the foundations of the modern Turkish 
constitutional law while he was president of the state 
council which was first established in 1868. Midhat Pasa, 
35. G.L. Lewis, Turkey (London, 1965), p.39. 
36. Mohammad Barakatullah, The Khilafat (London, 1924), 
p.3. 
12 
submitted a draft to the state council in June 1876, known 
as Qanuni Assasi, containing the outlines of a 
37 
constitution. 
The new parliament held only two sessions. It was 
opened on March 19, 1877 and adjourned sine die on 
February 13, 1878. Abdiil Hamit II had adopted an absolute 
theory of his imperial office which he proceeded to put into 
38 practice. 
Constitutional Movement (1878-1908) 
The Tanzimat saw the emergence of an Ottoman middle 
class within an intellectual awakening. These people 
sidetracked the ulema and took over the cultural leadership 
of the community. The nature and contents of Ottoman 
literature were changed from their traditional outlook to 
those imported from the west such as plays^ novels, short-
stories, essays and political tracks etc. The Ottoman 
printing press made this possible. This literary movement 
was started from about 1865. Mehmet Bey, Nuri Bey, 
37. Alfred B., op.cit, pp. 13-14 
38. February 5, 1877 the Sultan had dismissed and 
banished Midhat Pasa, who was later tried on a 
false charge of having murdered Sultan Abdiil Aziz, 
he was then exiled to Taif near Mecca and then 
clandestinely estranged in 1884. 
13 
Resat Bey, Nairdk Kemal, Ayatullah Bey and Refik Bey were 
the six people who had decided to oppose the policy of the 
39 
Ottoman government. 
They started a new movement termed the new Ottomans 
or Young Ottomans. Their aim was to oppose the human rights 
aspect of the Tanzimat. In order to include all the strata 
of the society they put forward the theory of Ottomanism 
40 (Osmanlilik) m place of the millet identity. Of the 
41 Young Ottomans three were more important namely Ziya Pasa, 
42 43 
Ibrahim ^ina?i and Namik Kemal. They were the 
pioneers of the new literary movement. 
39. M. Serif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman 
Thought (New Jersey,1962), pp. 10-11. 
40. Ottomanism was inclined to gather together all the 
Turks of the world regardless of race, religion or 
sect, into a nation with parliamentry system. 
41. Ziya Pasa (1825-80) was a famous Turkish poet and 
writer, and a fast friend of Namik Kemal. 
42. Ibrahim ^inasi (1824-71) was a Turkish editor and 
poet who initiated the movement of democratization 
of the Turkish language. 
43. Namik Kemal (1840-88) was a Turkish poet and thinker 
who fought for a constitutional regime and infested 
the ideas of liberty, progress, and patriotism 
among the Turkish intelligensia. 
14 
These new Ottomans played an important role in 
depositing Sultan Abdul Aziz (1861-1876) in 1876. In this 
event as well as in the deposition of Sultan Murat V in 
44 1876, four months later they were assisted by Midhat Pasa. 
The dissolution of the parliament by Sultan Abdul 
Hamit II in 1878 was a setback to the Young Ottomans their 
causes.Then followed the despotic period of Sultan Abdul 
Hamit II's reign. Some of the Young Ottoman thinkers were 
banished from the Empire while others were imprisoned or 
beheaded. Sait Pasa (1838-1914) was appointed grand vizir 
45 in 1879.^ 
Young Turks Revolution (1908-1918) 
46 The educational reforms of Sultan Abdul Hamit 
resulted in producing a number of bureaucrats, doctors, 
officers and writers. Also the new system of education 
introduced the Ottoman to the comparatively liberal thoughts 
of Western Europe. Under this influence liberal minded 
44. For details of the role of Midhat Pasa, see Bernard 
Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey' (London,1961), 
pp. 156ff. Also consult Ali Hayder Midhat, The Life 
of Midhat Pap (London, 1903). 
45. Also known as Kucuk Sait. He was grand vizir nine 
times 1879-80, 1880-82, 1882, 1882-85, 1895, 
1901-03, 1908, 1911-12. For details see. S.J. Shaw 
and E.K. Shaw, op.cit, p.219. 
46. For the educational reforms of Sultan Abdul Hamit 
See Bernard Lewis, op.cit, p. 177-8. 
15 
Ottoman came to the forefront. Like minded groups gradually 
came together throughout Europe. These were the first to be 
47 called the Young Turks. 
They came from different backgrounds and a large 
number of them consisted of the young Ottomans who had gone 
into exile. In 1889 the first organized opposition group 
came into being at the Istanbul Imperial Military Medical 
48 College. This group was headed by one Ibrahim Temo, an 
Albanian and consisted of four students. They called their 
group the Society of Union and Progress. There were other 
groups also which rose and fell but this group servived. 
Their basic programme was constitutionalism, Ottomanism and 
49 freedom which could be achieved by replacing the Sultan. 
47. This movement was started by those people who were 
neither young nor ethnically Turkish. The name 
seems to have originated with La June Turguie 
founded and published in France by a Lebanese 
Moronite Christian Khalil Ghanim. Lois A. Aroian 
and R.P. Mitchell, The Modern Middle East and North 
Africa, (New York, 1984), p. 113. 
48. Ibrahim Temo (Edhem) was an Albanian Christian who 
joined with two Kurds, Abdullah Cevdet and Ishak 
Sukuti and a Circassian student Mehmet Resit. 
49. S.J. Shaw & E.K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire 
and Modern Turkey (Cambridge, 1977), p.256. 
16 
With time other associations also established but 
their activities were mainly abroad. Ahmet Riza 
(1859-1930) and Mehmet Murat Efendi^ "*" (1853-1912) were the .; 
main leaders of the movement. 
50. Son of an Austrian mother. Ahmet Riza was a key 
figure of the young Turks. Educated in France. He 
first served in the ministry of Agriculture. He also 
served the ministry of education as its director 
before going to Europe where he remained £1111889. 
He was influenced by Auguste Comte. In 1894 he 
published a series of memorandums to the Sultan 
demanding a constitutional regime. Along with other 
exile, he started publishing a fortnightly journal 
Mesveret in 1895 which was smuggled into the 
Empire and played a key role in increasing the 
member of the society. He had different ideas he 
never rejected Islam, he was a disciple of Auguste 
Comte, and did not think in terms of Pan-Islamism. 
51. He was second to Ahmet Riza in developing the Young 
Turks movement. A Caucasian Turks from Daghistan. 
He was educated in Russia from where he fled to the 
Ottoman Empire in 1873. He established contact 
with many liberal writers and pulished his onw works 
including a six volume general history and a single 
volume Ottoman history. He presented several reform 
proposals to the Sultan. In 1895 he fled to the 
British occupied Egypt where he published a news-
paper Mezan which was openly critical of the Sultan 
and his regime. This newspaper was also smuggled 
into Ottoman Empire and generated considerable 
reaction. 
17 
The Committee of Union and progress (henceforth the 
CUP) developed within the Empire so much so that by the end 
of 1895 a coup attempt was thwarted and the members of the 
group within the Empire were supressed. Consequently many 
of them fled the Empire and went to Europe increasing the 
strength of the movement there. 
The strength of the Young Turks increased later 
when it was joined by another organization "the Ottoman 
Freedom Association" which was established in Salonica in 
1906.^^ Its founder was Talat Bey^^ (1874-1921). His group 
also includes a number of Army Officers and government 
officials. Apart from the Muslims it also received the 
backing of Christian minority groups which gave support to 
54 the CUP m the hope of national independence. The 
military group among them was started by graduates of the 
52. K.H. Karpat, op.cit., p.l4. 
53. He was an Islamised Bulgarian gypsy and a son of a 
poor family of Edirne. He was born in 1874. He was 
a chief clerk in the correspondence division of 
Salonica directorate Posts and Telegraphs. In 
Salonica he render great service led the Young Turk 
cause. 
54. K.H. Karpat, Loc.cit. 
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War Academy in Istanbul and included Mustafa Kemal 
(1881 - 1938). 
The Young Turks revolution finally succeeded in 
1908. The effect was that it curbed the autocratic rule of 
Sultan Abdul Hamit. . Also, it dealt with three important 
problem concerning nature of government, identity of the 
citizen-subjects of the Empire, and teritorial integration. 
There was jubilation with cries of liberty, equality and 
justice every where. The new regime had taken power without 
bloodshed. They limited the Sultan's power especially the 
power to dissolve the chamber. The Ulema, though still 
influential were now not dominant . Finally sultan Abdul 
Hamit was replaced by Mehmet V (1909-1918).^^ In this 
regime Nationalism proved stronger than religion, also 
Arab attitude in World War I discredited Pan-Islamism in 
Turkey and strengthened the position of the nationalists. 
The E alkan War of 1913 also shattered the idea of Ottomanism. 
55. Mustafa Kemal was commissioned officer at the 
General Staff Academy. He was arrested in 1905 as a 
revolutionary. On his release he was stationed at 
Damascus where he organized Vatan (Fatherland) a 
secret revolutionary society which spread among 
officers of the fifth Army corps in Syria. Kemal 
was also able to organise branches of Fatherland 
among officers of the Third Army Corps. This society 
developed to be the Fatherland and Liberal Society. 
On the eve of the revolution Mustafa Kemal was 
transferred to Salonica in 1907. 
56. Ibid., p. 109. 
57. Ibid., p. 16. 
19 
The man who emerged as the philosopher and exponent 
of Turkism was Ziya Gokalp (1875-1924).^^ After the Balkan 
War Westernization process was stepped up. The greatest 
59 
achievement and progress was in the field of education. 
Another remarkable change was ideological i.e. Secularism 
gained popularity. Islam was openly discussed and issues 
60 
regarding the rights of women were talked about. Consequently 
a revised family law was introduced giving more rights to 
61 
women. 
The Young Turks rule got involved in a series of War 
including World War I. The Great War of 1914-18 ended the 
Young Turks era in the choaos of defeats. Thus, it can be 
taken that the young Turks regime failed but in the long run 
it transmitted to the further future of the progress 
of the last hundred years and above all contributed to the 
ideological and social development which made possible the 
emergence of the Republic of Turkey. 
58. A detailed study of Ziya Gokalp's life and work has 
been written by Uriel Heyd, Foundation of Turkish 
Nationalism, (London, 1950). 
59. Halide Edib, Turkey Faces West, (Yale, 1930), p.128. 
60. R.H. Davison, Turkey, (New Jersey, 1968) p.114. 
61. For details see Halide Edib, Turkey Faces West, 
p. 129. -' 
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CHAPTER - II 
WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE 1918-1923 
After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World 
War I, the Armistice of Mudros which sealed the fate of 
Ottoman Turks, was signed on October 30 , 1918 and the 
Turkish troops began to lay down their arms. Later an 
Allied fleet landed their troops at Constantinople with the 
purpose of fighting the Bolsheviks in Russia but their main 
aim was to dismember the Ottoman Empire. 
After that a series of arrests and prosecutions 
began against the former leaders and supporters of the Union 
and Brogress. The Sultan and his ministers wanted to crush 
Allies main purpose was to create a Greek Empire in 
the Near East in which Thrace and Smyrna v/ere 
included. Strait of Bosphorus should have^to b^ opened 
for all the nations and wanted to establish an 
Armenia in the East from Samsun to the Caspian Sea, 
and from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea. Kemal 
H. Karpat, Turkey's Politics, p.32 G.L. Lewis, 
Turkey (London, 1955), p.48, A.J. Toyn bee, Nationality 
and War (London, 1915), pp. 379-433. 
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2 3 
the Young Turks. Enver Pasa and Cemal Pa^a were dismissed 
from the army in January 1919. Later they were assassinated. 
The condition of Ottoman Empire was very pitiable. Since 
the Sultan had no definite political party on his side so he 
had become a puppet of the Allies who now ruled. Overall 
Enver Pa^a was born in Istanbul in 1881, the son of 
a father variously described, by his friends or 
enemies, as a railway official or a porter. He was 
a graduate of the War College in Istanbul. He 
joined 'Young Turks' and first achieved fame as a 
'hero of freedom', by his role in the revolution of 
1908. After serving as military attach in Berlin 
and then as a highly popular field officer, he 
returned to Istanbul and led the raid on Sublime 
Porte. In 1913 he became Minister of War, general 
and Pasa. In 1914 by marrying an Ottoman princess, 
he even acquired the little of Damad. (See Bernard 
Lewis, op.cit., p.221. 
Cemal Bey, later became Pasa, born in Istanbul in 
1872. He was a product of War College and an early 
recruit to a Young Turks. After the Coup de'tat of 
January 1913 he became military Governor of 
Istanbul and showed great skill in organising the 
Police Force and directing their work for the 
preservation of the regime and army commander in 
Syria. He was known as a man of high professional 
competences in military matters of personal 
authority and responsibility and of a cold, 
fanatical ruthlessness when he judged it necessary 
for the cause he served. See Bernard Lewis, 
op.cit., p.-221.- - , • •-^ . " ' ' . , 
22 
4 
the administrative control was in the hands of the British. 
Turkish people were beaten and dispirited. The Sultan was 
ready to accept almost any thing that the Allies chose to 
impose on them. The Muslim Turks were replaced by the 
Christians in most of the local governments as well as other 
public utilities. The Muslims were discriminated against. 
Events developed at a fast pace. At the Paris Peace 
conference Greece laid its claim for Izmir (Smyrna). On 
May 15, 1919, protected by British, French and American 
Warships, a Greek army landed at Izmir which aroused 
7 immediate resentment throughout Turkey. 
4. Halide Edib, Turkey Faces West, Op. cit., p.166-167. 
5. Halide Edib, Turkish Ordeal (Istanbul, 1940), 
pp. 16-18. 
6. It was presented by a Greek delegate named 
Venizelous, with the claim for the possession of 
Izmir. By its terms all the European territories 
except the small area around Istanbul, was cut away 
from Turkey, the Straits were demilitarized and made 
open to all ships at all times under an 
international commission so on and so forth. R.H. 
Davison, , Op.cit., p.119-20). 
7. Gaston Gaillard, The Turks and Europe, (London,1921 
pp. 151-171, Donald E. Webster, The Turkey of 
Ataturk (Philadelphia, 1939) and on Greek's action 
in ;^atolia see A.J. Toynbee, The Western Question 
and Greece and Turkey (New York, 1922). 
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Four days later on May 19, 1919. Mustafa Kemal 
o 
Pasa landed at Samsun on the Black Sea coast of Anatolia 
as the inspector general of the Third Army. With this began 
9 
a new chapter in the history of modern Turkey. The 
political scene was such that the country was now divided 
between two thoughts - one was the Sultan and his government 
in Istanbul whose chief aim was to preserve and save the 
monarchy, and, the other was Mustafa Kemal and his followers 
in Anatolia who principally aimed at the territorial 
integrity and national independence. 
8. He was born in Salonica in 1880. His father, Ali 
Riza Efendi was a minor custom official. His 
mother's name was Zubeyda. Mustafa, in accordance 
with a Turkish tradition was given a second name 
Kemal (Perfection) by his teacher, a name which he 
eventually came to use almost exclusively. Numerous 
biographies of Mustafa Kemal have been written. For 
details of his life see, D.E. Webster, The Turkey 
of Ataturk : Social Process in the Turkish Refor-
mation (Philadelphia, 1939); Eleanor Bisbee, The 
New Turks : Pioneers of the Republic, 1920-1950 
(Philadelphia, 1951) ' Lord Kinross, Ataturk : A 
Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of the Modern 
Turkey (New York and London, 1965)? Irfan and 
Margarete Orga, Ataturk (London, 1962). 
9. Donald S. Webster, The Turkey of Ataturk, Philadel-
phia 1939), p. 45. 
10, Kemal H. Karpat, pp.cit., p.33. 
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Even before the Sivas Congress was called, the 
society for defence of the Right of Eastern Anatolia had 
12 
arranged a regional meeting to be held in July in Erzurum 
in response to the threat of further Armenian agression in 
the East. Kemal had also secured a promise of assistance on 
^ . . 1 3 
the part of the army commanders, Kazim Karabekir, 
14 
minister of War in Istanbul FevziPasa(Marsal Cakmak), and 
11. This society was founded by the revolutionaries of 
Anatolia to defend the national right of all the 
Eastern Provinces. But later it was turned into 
Association for Defence of Rights of Anatolia and 
Rumelia and later Mustafa Kemal ccSiverted it into real 
political party known as people's jerty. 
12. Erzurum congress was called by the Society for the 
Defence of the Rights of Eastern Anatolia. Its 
original aim was the protection of the eastern 
provinces. The declaration drawn up at this congress 
becomes the basis for the national pact that 
followed. It adopted a ten-point resolution whereby 
the principles were set forth by which the war of 
independence was to be fought for the text of the 
resolution. See S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw, Op. Cit, , 
P., 344-46. 
13. He was commander of 15th Army Corps at Erzurum. 
Later he became an opponent of Mustafa Kemal 
indirectly claimed to have been the first to 
organize the liberation movement in the Eastern part 
of the country. Kazim Karabekir, Istiklal 
Harbimizin Esaslari, (Istanbul, 1933, 1951), pp.44. 
Cf. K.H. Karpat, Turkey's Politics, p.47. 
14. Marsal Cakmak, who was very pious and pro-Islamist 
as proven during his chairmanship of the Millet 
Partisi (National Party) in 1948-1950, remained as 
Chief of Staff throughout Atatiirk's. life time. It 
was reliably reported that no alcoholic drinks were 
allowed in a^kmate presence out of his religious 
feelings. Throughout the Republic mosques remained 
open, and two religious holidays were officially 
recognized. 
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other nationalists. The Istanbul Government ordered Kazim 
Karabekir to arrest Mustafa Kemal and Rauf Bey but he 
refused and instead declared his own revolt as well as his 
acceptance to Kemal's leadership. 
In the capital the new deputies were loyal to the 
17 Sivas Congress. They were truculent and demanding the aims 
of the congress again and again. The Allies with the 
consent of the Sultan, demanded the resignation of War-
Minister, Ali Riza who was though not in favour of the 
Kemalists fcut was also not actively opposed to him. He was 
18 
replaced by Salih Pasa. In December 1919, as a result of 
15. He was a staunch supporter of Mustafa Kemal from the 
early days of the Nationalist movement and remained 
a military officer. He was, honest opponent of 
one-man rule so he resigned his military post and 
joined Progressive Republican Party. 
16. S.J.Shaw & E.K.Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and 
Modern Turkey, Vol. 2, (London, 1977), reprint 1986, 
p.344. 
17. It was the second most important congress which was 
attended by the delegates not only from East but 
also from all over the nation, including _^  far off 
Thrace. The main aim of this Congress was to fulfil 
all the decisions taken at Erzurum. Here Mustafa 
Kemal, once again, was elected Chairman. The 
Association for the Defence of the Rights of Eastern 
anatolia now became the Association for Defence of 
Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia. See S.J. Shaw and 
E.K. Shaw, Ibid. .P. 344. 
18. Salih Pasa was a Navy Minister under the Grand vizir 
Ali Riza Pasa who sent him to Amasia to negotiate 
with Mustafa Kemal for election purpose. Cf. Carl 
Brockelmann, History of the Islamic People (London, 
1952), p. 439. 
26 
nationalist persuasion and pressure the new grand vizir 
called election in which Kemal and his sympathisers won the 
majority and on January 28 > 1920 the new house unanimously 
19 
endorsed the National Pact. On March 16,1920 the British 
forces captured Istanbul. They arrested many of the deputies 
incouding Rauf Bey and many nationalist sympathisers who 
20 
were deported to Malta. In protest against the arrest and 
deportation of its members by British occupation forces, 
Kemal Atatlirk dissolved the House and issued his call for a 
new election of the Grand National Assembly with plenary 
21 
powers to meet at Ankara. 
In April 1920 Sultan Mehmet Resat had recalled Damad 
22 . . 
Ferid Pasa as Grand Vizir but under strong Allied 
pressure he had to resign and give the charge to Tevfik 
23 Pasa. 
19. It was based on declaration of Erzurum and Sivas 
Congress and formulating the basic demands for 
territorial integrity and national independence. 
20. Irfan Orga, Phonix Ascendant. The Rise of Modern 
Turkey (London, 1958), pp. 84-'85. 
21. D.A. Rustow, "Politics and Islam in Turkey 
1920-1955" in R.N. Frye (ed.), Islam and the West 
(Netherland, 1957), p.76. 
22. He was brother-in-law of the Sultan and a friend of 
the Allies. He had always been an outspoken enemy 
of the Committee of Union and Progress. 
23. He was the last Grand Vizir of the Ottoman Empire 
and served as an Ambassador to London. He was also 
suspect to the Allies and an opponent of the 
nationalists. (CF. C. Brockelmann, Op.cit., p.438). 
27 
The French government realising the truth of the 
establishment of a new regime in Turkey sent M. Franklin-
Bouillon to Ankara to arrange the terms of a separate 
agreement between France and Turkey, which was signed on 
October 20, 1921 amidst strong protests from Great Britain. 
By the terms of this agreement, variously known as the 
Franklin - Bouillon Pact, the Angora Agreement or the 
Franco-Turkish Treaty, a new boundary more favourable to 
Turkey as compared to the sevres lines was drawn between 
Syria and Turkey by mutual agreement between Turkey and 
France(the mandatory power). Even before the French with-
drawal from Cilica the Italian's had quietly withdrawn their 
own forces from Adalia and the neighbourhood. 
During the spring and autumn of that year Italy had 
25 
come to a friendly agreement with the Kemalist Government. 
The victory of the nationalists in Anatolia rendered 
meaningless the treaty of sevres signed in 1920 and 
necessitated a revised international agreement in the light 
of the new situation. 
On November 22, 1922 the Lausanne Conference was 
convened. Turkey was represented by Ismet Pasa. After a 
stormy session and one adjournment the Treaty of Lausanne was 
24. A.J. Toynbee and Kirkwood, Turkey (London, 1926), 
p.102. 
25. Ibid., p.103. 
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finally signed on July 2 , 1923 by Bulgaria, England, 
France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Rumania, the Soviet Union, 
Turkey and Yougoslavia. Despite its earlier interest in the 
area, the United States already withdrawing from world 
affairs, sent only observers to Lausanne. In the 
deliberations, Turkey's Ismet refused to be bullied by the 
British Lord Curzon and other Allied delegates. 
In the final settlement, Turkey, Greece and Italy 
devided the contested Aegean Islands Russia agreed that 
Turkey could reassert full sovereignty over the straits. 
The Mudany3 agreement regarding Thrace was confirmed. 
A compulsory exchange of Greeks and Turks did not apply to 
Istanbul or to Turks in Western Thrace, and Greeks and 
Armenians remain in Istanbul to this day. From Anatolia, 
1.5 million Greeks (Greek Orthodox Turks) moved to 
Greece, while 500,000 Turks (Muslim Greeks) left Greek 
territory for Turkey. Questions left outstanding were the 
demilitarization of the straits and the Mosul border. The 
British were to negotiate those issues on behalf of Iraq. 
26. By its terms the Greek army would move West of the 
Mariitsa, turning over its position in Thrace to the 
Allies, who would in turn surrender them to Turks. 
The Allies would occupy the right bank of the 
Mariitsa, and Allied Forces would stay in Thrace for 
a month to assure law and order. In return Kemal's 
army would recognize continued British occupation of 
the Straits Zones until the final treaty was 
signed. This arrangement included also Istanbul, 
which thus would have to wait a little while longer 
for liberation. Cf. S.J. & E.K. Shaw, op.cit. ,p.364. 
29 
There were important economic provisions in the 
Lausanne Treaty. Turkey secured the abolition of the 
capitulations and the debt administration. Foreign occupied 
states arising from the Empire's partition agreed to take on 
proportionate share of the debt. The Allies cancelled 
pre-war economic agreements and concessions while Turkey 
agreed to maintain the present tariff levels. Turkey already 
gaining the freedom to establish a new framework for further 
concessions, soon utilized in agreement with Americans 
interested in oil and communications. Americans secured for 
the first time a stake in West Asia's oil. In the process 
27 
Turkey sustained her hard-won independence in a key area. 
While peace negotiations were being conducted in 
Lausanne some important political developments took place in 
the country itself which ultimately were to solve the 
paradox that now resulted from the abolition of the 
no 
Sultanate. The country had now a religious head - the 
Caliph, whereas the political power resided in the Grand 
National Assembly. The alternatives were either to proceed 
and bring political developments to their logical conclusion 
and formally establish the Republic or to revert to the old 
27. L.A. Aroian and R.P. Mitchell, The Modern Middle 
East and North Africa (New York, 1984), p.163-4. 
28. For details see Chapter VI 'Secularism'. 
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system and re-invest the Caliph with temporal powers, or 
separate the religious and temporal powers by placing the 
Caliph in charge of the first and the government in charge 
of the second. There was strong opposition among some 
conservatives in the Grand National Assembly who considered 
the government and Caliphate inseparable. 
The Grand National Assembly itself seemed in no 
mood to undertake radical decisions without an assembly 
more respective to changes and without some control over it 
to bring about a unity of views. The Grand National 
Assembly was induced to dissolve itself on April 1, 1923 
and submit to new elections. The election compaign which 
followed was dominated by Mustafa Kemal's group in 
29 Assembly. Opposition to the growing personal power of 
Mustafa Kemal appeared as a splinter group within the 
language known as the 'second group' in contadistinction to 
the original group' comprising of 260 strong of Kemal'.s 
closest adherents. The members of the second group numbered 
30 
about forty. Mustafa Kemal issued a nine-point election 
platform on April 8, 1923, in which he proposed to transform 
31 the Defence Association into a political party. The 
platform also included a declaration to the effect that the 
29. Kemal H. Karpat, op.cit., p.41-2. 
30. G.L. Lewis, op.cit., p.75 ... 
31. Mustafa Kemal's party in the Assembly was Associa-
tion for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and 
Rumelia. 
31 
Caliphate dependent on the Grand National Assembly, was a 
lofty institution of the Muslim World. 
The election returned to the Assembly a large body 
of Deputies (one deputy elected for every 20,000 people 
instead of 50,000 as in the past) most of whom were 
32 generally in agreement with Mustafa Kemal. The new 
Assembly convened on August 11, 1923 and Fethi Bey replaced 
33 Rauf Bey as Premier. 
Meanwhile on October 13, 1923, Ismet Pasa introduced 
a bill in the Assembly which moved the capital of Turkey 
from Istanbul to Ankara. This action besides symbolizing 
the resurgence of the new Turkey had the practical purposes 
of providing a central defensible location for the 
government and of keeping the Grand National Assembly away 
34 from Istanbul which was more m favour of the Caliph. 
The announcement by an Ankara newspaper of October 9, 1923 
that the Republic would soon be proclaimed 
aroused violent controversy in and out of the 
32. Kemal H. Karpat, op.cit., p.42. 
33. At the Peace Conference of Lausanne, Rauf Bey was 
in favour of the Sultanate but Ismat was not. This 
was a further clash between Mustafa Kemal and Rauf 
Bey . Rauf refused to welcome Ismet Pasa back to the 
capital. Mustafa Kemal reminded him sharply his 
duty but Rauf refused and resigned. Irfan Orga, 
op.cit., p.139. 
34. Ibid, p.42. 
32 
Assembly. The cabinet presided over by Fethi Bey (Okyar) 
resigned on October 27, 1923 and the Deputies tried to agree 
on a new cabinet which might have a chance of general 
35 
acceptance. 
The Turks, thus, were the only one of the central 
powers able to overturn immediately the vindictive 
settlements imposed by the Allies following World War I. 
Because Turkish resistance ultimately was led to success by 
Mustafa Kemal, it has been assumed that he created it as 
well. He did indeed, do more than any one else to create 
the Turkish Republic on the ruire of the Ottoman Empire, but 
he accomplished this by bringing together elements of 
resistance that had already emerged. He coordinatoa their 
efforts, expressed their goals, personified their ambitions, 
and led them to victory 
35. G.L. Lewis, op.cit,.., p.77. , . 
36. S.J. Shaw & E.K. Shaw, Op. cit., p.340. 
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CHAPTER - III 
REPUBLICANISM 
The Kemalist principles, what is known as Kemalism, 
are the fundamental conceptional basis of the Turkish 
revolution that ensued immediately after the war of 
Independence and resulted in the formation of a national and 
secular Turkish State. The event, which occured in the 
years following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, 9ave 
birth to 'Kemalism' named after the leader of the movement, 
1 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. 
Mustafa Kemal was a revolutionary from the very 
beginning of his career and therefore his ideas did not 
differ much from those of the radical members of the Young-
2 . . . 3 
Turks such as Abdullah Cevdet and Ziya Gokalp. At the 
1. Enver Ziya Karal, "The Principle of Kemalism" in Ali 
Kazancigil and Ozbudun ed . , Ataturk Founder of a 
Modern State (London, 1981), p.11. 
2. Abdullah Cevdet (1869-1932) was one of the founder 
of the Secret Revolutionary Society which was formed 
with the purpose of overthrowing Sultan Abdul Hamit, 
at the Military Medical School of Istanbul in 1898 
which was later developed into the Union and 
Progress Party. 
3. Ziya Gokalp (1876-1924) was one of the greatest 
Turkish thinkers. He is regarded as an author, 
poet, sociologist, historian, philosopher, man of 
public affair and ideological slogan thinker. He is 
also aclaimed as the father of Turkish Nationalism. 
His real name was Mehmet Ziya and Gokalp ovas his 
penname. But he is better known by his penname after 
1911. Gokalp is compound of two words 'Gok' meaning 
'Sky' and 'alp' meaning hero and brave. 
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same time he was able to develop a pattern of thought 
peculiar to himself. Since he enjoyed a unique position of 
being the hero of the Turkish Revolution and the Head of the 
State, therefore, he directed his policies according to the 
needs of the time. In this way his reforms remained 
unparalleled as compared to the Westernization procedure 
implemented in Turkey since the reign of Sultan Selim III 
(1879 - 1807). 
The term Kemalism was first used by Western authors. 
Later, in Turkey, it was referred to as 'Kemalist 
principles'. Kemalism is also classified as a collection of 
idealism and principles. on the other hand a Turk Yakub 
Kadri Karaosmanoglu, who is considered one of the idealogues 
of Kemalism, claims that there is no such thing as the 
principles of Kemalism. There is just one principle : to 
defeat the imperialistic intention of the imperialist 
nations in Turkey. 
Mustafa Kemal himself said "The aim of the reforms 
we have already carried out and are continuing to carry out 
is to transform the Turkish society into a modern society in 
4 
in every aspect. This is the basis of our reforms." 
The six principles of Kemalism, are Republicanism, 
Nationalism, Populism, Secularism, Etatism and Revolutionism. 
Originally these six principles were a six point programme 
of the Republican Party. These six principles were 
4. Ibid., p.15. 
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incorporated into the Turkish constitution in 1937. 
Republicanism is the fundamental principle of the 
new Turkish state, and took its place in the constitution 
v\/hen the Republic was proclaimed on October 29, 1923. Its 
pre-eminence vis-a-vis the other five principle is noted as 
follows : "The first statement of this law cannot, by 
whatever means, be replaced or diverted - the form of 
government of the Turkish state is republican". 
The quoted article of the constitution was kept 
unchaged, and the pre-eminence of the principle of 
Republicanism continued. 
However the concept of republicanism came to be 
adopted and made a fundamental piller of the new state only 
gradually as in the case of other principles. There is no 
doubt about the fact that republicanism was a logical 
conclusion of Kemalist philosophy of state which sought to 
provide Turkey with a completely new system. The Atatiirk was 
guided in as much as by new modern and western ideas as he 
was opposed to the old, traditional institutions of 
government. Republicanism as a form of government was 
perhaps the only possible form of government in which the 
dreams of Ataturk could have been realized. 
Republicanism was the turning point in the political 
philosophy of the Turks. The new Turkish republic was a 
state founded by the Turkish nation, on its own account, 
36 
on its own land. Throughout history, both before and after 
the coming of Islam, and internal and foreign policies could 
only be evaluated according to the character of their 
founders. Republicanism came into being without going 
through a phase of ideological preparation. From Tanzimat 
to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, most Turkish authors, 
reflecting various aspects of Western political ideas, 
showed strong opposition to the idea of founding a Republic 
of Turkey. During the second constitutional period, none of 
the political parties appeared to favour a Republic. 
National Sovereignty : 
Republicanism introduced the modern concept of 
national sovereignty. This principle was embodied in two 
clear statements in the founding of the Grand National 
Assembly, without the word 'republic' being used 
'No power is superior to the G.N.A.' 
'The G.N.A. has the power to make and to implement 
laws.' 
Ever since its inception on the April 23, 1920, 
the new Turkish State has been based on democratic 
foundations. The clause in the Turkish constitution which 
5. Ibid., p.16. 
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affirmed that "Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the 
Nation" became the factor which guided Turkey's entire 
administrative machinery. The new National Assembly, 
however, was full of cliques which did not easily agree on 
the new form of government. After months of debates, they 
adopted the fundamental Constitutional Act, committing 
themselves to the principle that "the people personally and 
effectively direct their own destinies." But the cliques 
went on debating details : how to fit the Sultan-Khalif into 
a system based on the new principles whether to appoint or 
to elect cabinet ministers; and so on until a crisis in the 
provisional cabinet caused Atatiirk suddenly to announce that 
Turkey would be a Republic. In October 1923 the Assembly 
voted the Republic into legal existence. It elected Atatiirk 
as the first President. Six months later, this Assembly 
adopted a permanent constitution for the Republic. The Oath 
taken by the first deputies included the clause ; "I agree 
that the people shall have the sovereignty without any 
7 
qualification, so help me Allah." 
The new situation of the Turkish State was expressed 
by the slogan "Sovereignty belongs to the nation" (Hakimiyet 
milletindir). The concept was not found in the Ottoman 
6. Self-Government in Turkey, (Distributed by) Turkish 
Information Office, 444, East, 52nd , New York, n.d 
p.2. 
7. Eleanor Bisbee, The New Turks. (Philadelphia,1951), 
p.212. 
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constitution prograirune granted by the Sultan and the Union 
and Progress Party. In that constitution the legislative 
power belonged to the senior members of the Ottoman family,. 
Thus Republicanism arose as a reaction to the Sultanate and 
the Caliphate. It is righty stated that Republicanism 
involved not only replacement of the Sultanate by the 
Republic but also elimination of the whole social system in 
which a small ruling class governed and the mass of subject 
existed to support it .... Republicanism came into being 
without going through a phase of ideological separation. The 
Republic was to be by and for the people. They were made to 
realise that their interests were identical with those of 
the Republic and that its continued existence and prosperity 
g 
were essential for theirs. 
Freedom of Conscience ; 
Atatiirk placed freedom of conscience among the most 
natural and crucial rights of the individual, requiring the 
utmost protection. 
'Each person has liberty to think and believe 
freely, to possess a political view of his own fulfilment, 
and to act in any way to suit himself as far as the 
regulations of any religion are concerned". After this 
statement, Atatiirk also indicated that no individuals 
8. S.J.Shaw & S.K.Shaw , Vol. II, p. 375. 
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conscience could be guided by others. 
Atatiirk believed that political freedom, freedom of 
conscience and all other freedoms are a mere dream unless 
the social freedom is realized. It is a fact that all the 
torments Turkey has passed through were due to religious 
traditions standing in the way of social liberties. The 
development of social ethics and justice, in accordance with 
the development of social freedom, is another fact of 
9 Ataturk's revolution. The inviolability of life, property 
and honour is guaranteed. No one may be arrested or 
detained in any manner other than set forth by law. Thus it 
is obvious that everybody in Turkey, whether a Turk or a 
foreigner, enjoys without discrimination every right 
included in the democratic concept. 
Among the prerequisities of democracy is the 
inalienable right of every citizen to enjoy and exercise 
political liberty, that is his right to participate in the 
administration of the State either directly or through his 
chosen representatives. Thus each citizen has his say in 
every administrative organization and political rights are 
9. On August 12, 1925 the Ankara Independence Tribunal 
convicted the well known communist poet Nazim Hikmet 
and several of his colleagues of spreading communist 
propaganda. This indicated on the one hand there 
were limits on the extent Kemal would allow the 
Russians to take advantage of their Turkish friend-
ship and on the other hand it showed to what degree 
Atatiirk was tolerant towards his detractors. 
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utilized especially in the election of deputies who are the 
people's representatives in the National Assembly. 
Multiparty System ; 
There was no prohibition of the multitude of parties 
in the Constitution. But Kemalism came to dictate that the 
people's interest could best be served by focussing its 
energies into the party that Kemal had evolved out the 
committee to Defend the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, 
called first simply the People's Party (Halk Firkasi) and 
after the establishment of the Republic, the Republican 
People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi). There were 
several opposition groups during the War for Independence. 
12 Only the Second Goup (IkinciGurup) was important, however, 
13 
since it included a number of Kemal's close associates. 
10. Self Government in Turkey, Op.cit., p.2-3. 
11. This Committee was known as Society for the Defence 
of the Rights of Eastern Anatolia. But after Sivas 
Congress in 1919, Mustafa Kemal turned it into Society 
for Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia. 
12. Mustafa Kemal formed his own supporter into a group 
called the Defence of the Rights Group of Anatotia and 
Rumelia', more commonly known as the first group. 
This move prompted the conservative opponents of 
Kemal to form their own group, called the second 
group. 
13. Ergun Ozbudun, "The Nature of the Kemalist Political 
Regime", in Ali Kazancigil , Op.cit., p.80-81. 
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But since it basically represented the Westernists in the 
Assembly and includes some who opposed the basic tenets of 
Kejmalism, especially Secularism, Kemal made very certain 
that in the elections held in August 1923 for delegates to 
the second Grand National Assembly its members were 
defeated. Thus giving full control to his own party. It 
was mainly the subsequent challenges to secularism and 
modernism that led Kemal to exclude rival parties in the 
later years. Soon after the Caliphate was abolished, a 
14 
number of leading-military figures of the revolution, 
attacked the government's secularist and modernist policies. 
Kemal reacted by demanding that they give up either their 
military position or their assembly seat. They resigned 
from their military inspectorates and also from the 
Republican's Peoples Party on November 9, 1924, joining 
many members of the Second Group to form the Progressive 
Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Firkasi) which 
included also many respected civilian nationalists. The 
Progressive Party's basic idea was that the concentration of 
14. A group of Kemal's early colleagues, including two 
distinguished soldiers, Kazim Karabekir and Ali Fuat 
(Cebesoy) Refet Pa^a and Rauf (Orbay) and others 
broke with him on personal grounds. They were 
opposed to the abolition of the Caliphate and 
Kemal's dictatorial leadership. 
15. Kemal's personal ascendancy growing among those who 
were former supporters and closely associated with 
him in the early phases of the national struggle. 
Adnan Adivar and his wife, Halide Edib^ opposed 
abolition of the Caliphate and secularizing policies 
of the government. 
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all powers in the National Assembly without the control of 
an opposition would rest in authoritarianism. Its purpose 
therefore, was to strive to preserve individual freedom by 
"opposing the despotic tendencies of a few people and their 
oligarchic aim". For the movement Kemal bent slightly to 
their wishes by removing his devoted supporter Ismet Pasa 
against whom they had grievances, from premiership. On 
November 12, 1924 Mustafa Kemal appointed his old friend 
Ali Fethi (Okyar), regarded as a liberal, as Prime 
Minister. 
Kemal apparently allowed the party to grow because 
he felt that by this time opposition to the Republic was so 
weak that it could no longer gain mass support. But the 
new party's existence unleashed such a torrent of willing 
supporters from all sides of the political spectrum that the 
president and his associates soon were forced to recognize 
their error. 
Political insurrection was one thing, armed 
insurrection was another, and when, in February 
1925, a Kurdish revolt headed by Seyh Sait broke 
out in the Eastern provinces, Kemal acted swiftly 
and vigorously. Fethi proved to be a poor 
16. K.H. Karpat, Turkey's Politics, p.46. 
17. R.H. Davison, Turkey, p.130. 
18. Bernard Levis, op.cit., p. 260-61. 
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19 
administrator, and Ismet returned to power in March, 1925. 
The revolt was soon quelled, the rebels and supporters of 
20 the rebellion, including some newspapers, were dealt with 
severely. The government then turned against the 
Progressive Party, which the Tribunal of Independence had 
found to have been connected with the rebellion, although 
the proof was not clearly established. On the report of the 
Turbunal in Ankara, the progressive Republican Party was 
abolished on June 5, 1925. Fethi had meanwhile been 
21 
appointed on March 11, 1925 as Ambassador to France. 
As depressing and economic crisis string the kind of 
internal criticism that have gained revolutionary content 
unless given some means of expression, Kemal sought to 
create a limited opposition, channeling the discontent into 
a harmless movement that he could control. Feeling more 
secure, Kemal Ataturk withdrew the law for the maintenance 
of order in 1929, and the following spring Kemal invited his 
19. Sydney Nettleton Fisher, The Middle East ; A History, 
(New York, 1960), p.401. 
20. A number of newspapers were closed and their 
publishers brought before the court as early as 1924 
for defending the Caliphate. Ahmet Emin, Halide 
Edib and her husband Dr. Adnan Adiver were exiled 
from Turkey and lived in various places in Europe. 
For the trial of newspapermen see, Yalman, Turkey 
in My Time, pp. 151-157, Toynbee-Kirkwood, Turkey, 
pp. 189-90. 
21. Kemal H. Karpat^ op.cit., p.47'. ' . - '• -
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22 
old fr iend Fe th i Bey (Okyar), then Ambassador t o France, 
23 
to return and form an opposition party. 
Free Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Firkasi) 
was established, on August 12, 1930, by Fethi Bey (Okyar) at 
the direct suggestion of Mustafa Kemal who also urged others 
to join it, including with his own sister Makbula. Fethi 
published the party's new programme in the newspaper 
•Yarin'. He promised to work for freedom of thought and the 
press, reduction of taxes, lessening of estatism, and various 
24 
orther liberalizing principles. All Fethi soon began to 
build a national organization, touring the country to enlist 
mass support, advocating an end to state monopolies and the 
encouragement of free enterprise and foreign investment and 
lower taxes. This attracted to it immediately a large group 
of enthusiastic followers who courageously defied the 
party in power, as shown by Antigovernment demonstrationsin 
.' . 25 Izmir occasioned by Fethisvisit there. 
22. Atatiirk wrote to Fethi "I consider it one of 
the basis of the Republic to have a new party in 
Assembly, which based on similar principles (anti-
clerical) will debate freely the affairs of the 
nation". Cumhuriyet, August 12, 1930, quoted in 
Karpat, Turkey's Politics, p.65. •• ~ -
23. S.N. Fisher, Op.cit., p.401. 
24. William Spencer, Political Evolution in Middle East, 
(New York, 1962), p.71. 
25. After the establishment of his party, Fethi Bey was 
met in Izmir by thirty or forty thousand people who 
broke the window of the newspaper Andolu, which had 
criticized the newparty, and demonstrated against 
the ruling Republican Party. He also criticized the 
economic policy of the ruling party. Cumhurriyet, 
September 5,1930, Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey's Politics, 
p.65-66. 
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In the end the Free Republican Party, like his 
predecessors, were doomed by their success in stimulating 
the opposition not only of those republican supporters, who 
wanted to critize the rigors srid mistakes of the R.P.P. 
regime but also the reactionaries and communists, who 
sought to use the movement despite Ali Fethi's rigorous 
efforts to avoid their embrace. The extent of popular 
support for the new party again began to alarm the 
government. In addition, ministers and political leaders 
who bore the brunt of the new party's quite justified 
criticism of inefficiency, dishonesty or failure began to 
resent its existence and used their access to the president to 
27 
convince him it should be ended. 
The final blow came in the Assembly debate of 
November 15, 1930, when Ali Fethi (Okyar) complained of 
large scale irregularities. Most RPP members replied by 
28 
attributing the Free Republican Party's failure to its 
own inadequacies, in the usual political manner but one went 
so far as to accuse Ali Fethi (Okyar) himself of treason 
during the war for independence. 
26. Tension between the Republican and Liberal Parties 
reached a climax after municipal elections. Fethi, 
in a speech in the Assembly, bitterly denounced the 
government and the fact that it called his followers 
reactionary. 
27. S.J. Shaw & E.K. Shaw, op.cit., 382. 
28. Free Republican Party was also known as Liberal 
Party. Kemal H. Karpat in, Turkey's Politics and 
William Spencer in Political Evolution in Middle 
East, also writes this name. 
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Finally in November, Kemal's loyal opposition was 
disbanded. On November 15 Fethi (Okyar) accused the 
government, in the Assembly, of electoral malpractice, as 
shortly afterwards announced his decision to dissolve the 
Free Republican Party (Cumhuriyet Serbest Firkasi) 'because 
struggle against Kemal was impossible' . This decision was 
made known to the Ministry of the Interior in a letter of 
29 November 17, 1930. Two other minor parties that had 
appeared at about the same time were dissolvedby the order 
iT ^ L - ..30 
of the government. 
For the next fifteen years, Turkey remained subject 
to a one-party, one-man rule , with etatism dominant in 
31 
economic and secularism,nationalism m political matters. 
29. The Populist Republican Party (Ahali Cumhuriyet 
Firkasi ) established-inAdana, and the Turkish Workers 
and Peasants Republican Party (Turk Cumhuriyet Amele 
ve Ciftcj Partisi) established in Edirne, were 
closed the same year as the Liberal Party. Both the 
parties were not allowed to activate because it was 
considered communistic. 
30. Bernard Lewis, pp.cit., p..275. 
31. William Spencer, Op. cit, p.73. 
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CHAPTER - IV 
NATIONALISM (Mllliyetyilik) 
Three basic ideas emerged during 1923-1925 as the 
fundamental principles of the Turkish Republic i Nationalism 
was one of them. Nationalism in its simplest meaning 
claimed Turkey for the Turks. At the sametime it rejected 
jurisdiction of Turks over territories with non-Turkish 
population. Since then nationalism in Turkey has been the 
essential rallying cry for the war for Independence and the 
Republic. It is said that territorial losses and the 
refusal of the minorities to renounce their national 
aspirations in favour of a multinational Ottoman State 
turned Ottomanism to Turkish nationalism. Sometimes it is 
put as "Nationalism was at the basis of the regime and 
secularism was its chief means of fulfilling the ultimate goal of 
modern national Turkish Republici based on the sovereignty 
2 
of the nation". However, to be sure, nationalism is the 
foundation of the Republic and a basic tenet in the 
programme of all political parties of Turkey. In its 
external aspect it renounces all expansionist ideas, 
including Pan-Turanism, in respect to territories inhabited 
by Turks or those which were once part of the Ottoman 
1. S.J.Shaw&E.K.Shaw^ Op. cit., p.375. 
2. Kemal H. Karpat, Op. cit., p.49. 
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Empire. This policy brouyht peace to Turkey by making 
possible friendly relations with her neighbours in the 
3 
Balkans and the Near East. Indeed Pan-Turanism and Pan-
Islamism had lost their practical value by proving to be 
unrealizable. Moreover, the departure of minorities from 
Anatolia left Turkey culturally homogeneous, and then the 
task of the Republic in building a national state, and in 
strengthening a feeling of national consciousness in 
individual Turks was greatly facilitated. 
The modern Turks' most distinguishing 
characteristic is their fierce national pride and devotion 
to homeland that developed during the Allied (mainly Greek) 
invasion of Anatolia following the 1918 Ottoman defeat. The 
first genuine nationalist sentiment among the masses 
developed during the Turko-Greek war between 1919 and 1922. 
Until then, Turkish nationalism was a sentiment expressed 
almost exclusively by intellectuals and professionals of the 
small Ottoman ruling class m n who had little direct 
contact with the peasant and common masses. 
After World War I nationalism became the most 
important force in Turkey. On the one hand, it was used as 
an avenue to a new national culture, one freed from the 
failures of the Ottoman past; on the other hand, it was 
3. Ibid., p. 251. 
4. Lewis V. Thomas, "Nationalism in Turkey", in 
Nationalism in the Middle East (The Middle East 
Institute) Washington, D.C., 1952, p.5, see also 
his "The National and International Relations of 
Turkey," in Near Eastern Culture and Society, 
pp.167-187. "see alio; Davis ion, "Middle East 
Nationalism", pp. 327-348. 
49 
used as a shield against the conservatives who held to the 
old ideas and customs. In this way conservatives felt that 
they could devote themselves just as whole-heartedly and 
without reservation to Turkish nationalism as they had 
5 
dedicated themselves to Islam in the past. 
If we try to trace the origin of nationalism in 
Turkey we will find that nationalism as a political 
philosophy and slogan was for the first time raised by non-
Muslim communities who lived in far flung areas of the 
Ottoman Empire. This idea was a by product of the 
increasing influence of the European power in eastern 
countries. It is therefore the earliest slogan of 
nationalism and was heard immediately following the French 
Revolution. The Ottoman concept of a pan-Ottoman philosophy 
which the State attempted to pursue to achieve legal and 
political equality and form a homogeneous - Ottoman society, 
was unable to prevent the newly ejmerging political 
philosophy of nationalism nor could the Pan-Islamic 
movement prevent the spreading of these ideas among the 
non-Muslims. 
Ataturk's 1922 victory over the invading Allies 
helped to arouse a national sentiment of an intensity that 
5. Don Peretz, The Middle East Today Dryden Press, 
Hinsdale, (Ilinois, 1971), p.152. 
6. Enver Ziya Karal, Loc. cit, 
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7 had never before existed among the Turkish masses. Since 
the beginning of the modern times, a 'homeland' in Western 
notions has been defined as being within the national 
boundaries; this has been strongly supported in art and 
literature. In Ottoman society, however, the homeland was 
defined as being that which had been acquired by the empire 
in its era of expansion. As against this radical conception 
of Nationalism which meant "Turkey for Turks and Turks have 
no jurisdiction over non-Turk territories" the Pan-Islamists 
regarded the entire territories on which the Muslims lived 
as homeland, while Pan-Turanians considered as homeland 
g 
every inch of soil inhabited by the Turks. The erstwhile 
State and its geography, population - language, history and 
laws did not possess the name 'Turk'. The Turkif ication 
movement launched by such ideologues as Ziya Gbkalp had 
started close to the end of the second constitutional era. 
But actual Turkification movement began combined with the 
Turkish nationalism after the collaspe of the Empire, and 
the first big step in this direction was taken with the 
9 
acceptance of national boundaries at Erzurum Congress. 
7. Don Peretz, Op. cit., pp. 152-53. 
8. Enver Ziya Karal, Lpc. cit. 
9. Ibid., p. 18. 
51 
The Republic of Turkey was born from the ashes of 
Ottoman Empire and accepted nationalism, by necessity, as 
its main ideology to replace the broader concept of Islamism 
and Ottomanism. In Turkey, however, nationalism was 
identified with and represented in the form of a political 
state almost from its inception, and its identification gave 
to it both exclusiveness and cultural political absolutism 
in all fields of human activity. 
The idea of nationalism also served as an outlet for 
expressing all the bitterness and pain caused by the 
downfall of an Empire which had stood for centuries on equal 
footing with the major powers of the world. 
10. Kamal H. Karpat, Op.cit, p.252. 
11. The rulers and the bureaucracy of the Ottoman Empire 
found themselves overnight, at the end of the first 
World War, the citizens of a small and powerless 
country bound to follow the policy of bigger nations 
which had been its equals only a few years earlier. 
Although the new regime did its best to adjust 
public opinion to the country's new conditions, the 
older generation could not easily accept the 
situation. Thus the mourners for the past found in 
nationalism an outlet to express their bitterness 
against all the "enemies of the nation" who caused 
the downfall of the Empire. For additional views on 
the aspect of nationalism in Turkey, see B. Lewis, 
"History-Writing", pp. 223-225, quoted from Kemal H. 
Karpat, Op.cit., p.253. ' . 
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Nationalism in Turkey did not remain immune to the 
social and economic transformation. The rising middle 
classes used nationalism to protect themselves against 
social currents. The historical-cultural aspect of 
nationalism described above were bound to lose intensity as 
the goals which they served were attained. But socio-
economic considerations, growing in importance, led the 
middle classes to maintain the intense, all embracing 
character of nationalism, either by insisting on old 
slogans, or, when these became obsolete, by finding new 
ones, supposedly for maintaining national solidarity 
12 
against social currents disruptive of unity. 
In internal affairs, nationalism became the supreme 
force dominating all activities in the society, visualizing 
problems and moulding ideas in the light of its own 
conceptions. Idealistic Turkish intellectuals had viewed 
13 
nationalism, cleared of Islamic influences, as an avenue 
leading to the creation of a national culture and universal 
understanding. The Republic was to start a new life under 
the aegis of nationalism, consequently it tried to 
12. Ibid. 
13. See Memoirs of Halide Edi^, (New York, 1926), 
pp. 326ff, also IT. Levohian, Moselm Mentality, 
(London; 1928 pp. 55ff. 
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dissociate itself from the past and all that it 
entailed. 
Although nationalism in Turkey was of Western 
origin, the form it took in Turkey differed substantially 
from the original model. It was used to gather the support 
of the masses by the Westernized classes of the Middle East. 
The masses, although affected by its cultural aspect, 
accepted nationalism by identifying it with religion. 
Nationalism in Turkey produced practical results : it 
unified various sections of the Turkish population around 
common cultural goal, it created a feeling of national 
solidarity, it oriented the cultural development of the 
country in accordance with the original character of the 
nation, and finally, it gave to the individual Turk a 
feeling of national pride. 
14. It is for this reason that history was written in 
the Republic in order "to destroy what remained of 
Ottoman and Islamic feelings of identity, and 
replace them by one that was purely Turkish," and to 
restore national self-respect, which had been badly 
undermined in the past by the West's own biased 
anti-Turkish history. See Bernard Lewis, "History 
Writing", pp. 224-25, See also Lewis V. Thomas, 
"The national and International relation of Turkey" 
Near Eastern Culture and Society, pp. 179-187. 
15. Kemal H. Karpat, Op. cit., p. 254. 
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Mustafa Kemal's definition of Turkish nationalism 
was : 'The Turkish people forming the Turkish Republic are 
called the Turkish nation'. The doctrine of Turkish 
nationalism was expounded by the state through various 
media, through press, schools, various institutions of 
government and the like. Kemalist ideology asserted that 
the Turks were superior to all the other people as they 
were direct descendants of the world's greatest conquering 
race, that they had played an important and leading role in 
the developments of world civilization, and that it were the 
Turks who had contributed most to what had been achieved in 
the Ottoman Empire. 
To highlight the role of the Turks in history, the 
Turkish Historical society was founded in 1925. Nationalist 
theories of language and history were expounded, such as the 
Sun-Language Theory which claimed that all languages of the 
17 
world originated from Turkish. 
Turkish nationalism had cultural aspects too. The 
ideologues of the Turkish nationalism tried to make it a 
point that Turkish nationalism was not based on Turkish 
race. It was rather based on Turkish language. That is Turkish 
nationality is for the people who speak Turkish, who are 
16. Enverziya Karal, Loc. cit. 
17. S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw, Op. cit., p. 375-76. 
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brought up with Turkish culture, share Turkish ideals and 
who live on Turkish soil. These people are Turks, 
regardless of race and religion. 
Turkish nationalism also had humanist aspect. 'The 
Turkish nation regards itself as a prized and honourable 
member of the human family. Turks loved all humans and have 
no feeling of hostility unless the country's national pride 
or interest are violated. Turkish nationalism became a 
symbol of peace at the time when extreme racism was 
18 identified with imperialism. 
The concept of nationalism, however, underwent 
certain changes after the liberation of Turkey and 
establishment of modern Turk state. During the 1920's and 
1930's the theories of Turkish nationalism were severely 
expounded to achieve the Republic's aims and after the 
accomplishment of their object they were mostly abandoned. 
The idea of Turkish nationalism was not imperialistic as it 
did not aim to achieve greatness by regaining lands once 
ruled by the Ottomans to build their own land a modern state 
19 for the Turk within the boundries of the Republic. 
Modernization and Westernization continued at high 
speed and along with the reforms sanctified by law, a 
18. Enver Ziya Karal, Op. cit., p. 18-19. 
19. S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw, Op.cit., p. 376. 
56 
rr.ultitude of other Western habits, views, methods of work 
and business were adopted on an individual or group basis in 
20 
all fields. Islamic education was discouraged, anti-
21 
clericalist tendencies were encouraged, although, worship 
or attendance at the mosques was never prohibited. Strong 
concerted attacks were aimed at obscurantism, mysticism, 
supernaturalism and traditionalism, education in school 
stressed positivism and science. 
20. In 1925, only 284 students had remained in the 
theological school, in 1926-33 the number fell from 
167 to 2, and in 1941 it was closed for lack of 
students and later it had become the Institute for 
Islamic Research. Imam-hatip (Clergy) schools were 
also closed. Some religious instruction was offered 
in Hafiz-ve Kuran Kurslari which operated under the 
supervision of the Presidency of Religious Affairs. 
On the Religious schools, see Howard A. Reed 
"Turkey's New Imam-Hatip Schools", Die Welt des 
Islam, Vol. IV, 1955, No. 2-3, pp. 150-63, "The 
Faculty of Divinity at Ankara", Part I and II, 
The Muslim World, October 4, 1956, pp. 295-312 and 
XLVII, January 1, 1957, pp.22-35 respectively. 
21. Turkish intellectuals appraising the past twenty 
years of secularist policy in Turkey wrote. "Within 
the last twenty years the vast majority of the 
Turkish youth has been brought up without any 
official religious teaching. Western positivism 
being imposed on it just as Islamic dogma had been 
imposed in the past." Adivar, "Interaction", p.128. 
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Nationalism has become one of the central themes as 
well as the main pillar of the Kemalist Republic. To 
nationalize the country, Mustafa Kemal felt the need to 
chanye their military and civil administration and 
educational system to bring unity among the people by the 
same kind of education, purpose and interest, and an attempt 
was made to nationalize each and every aspect of life. In 
the following we will discuss the changes in various fields: 
Education : 
Of many other social reforms introduced by Mustafa 
Kemal the most important^ no doubt, was the development of a 
modern system of education through the Republic. In the 
Ottoman Empire, education had been under the control of the 
ulema. Beside each mosque there was usually a school. In 
small towns, the mosque was used as a school the main 
purpose of which was teaching children to read the Koran, 
to pray, and to perform the basic rituals of Islam. Those 
who wanted higher education attended special schools that 
22 
trained the Ulema. As a result for centuries whatever 
schooling a Turk could receive was in or near the mosque, 
where one of the chief functionaries was the Hoca (hodja) or 
teacher. The emphasis was on teaching Islamic sciences and 
22. Yahya Armajani, Op. cit,, p. 247. 
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Arabic language which was not understood by most Turks. 
Elementary education was limited to this sort of teaching ^^ 
unless the student sought to become a member of the ulema 
and make himself an authority on Islamic law. 
From the Tanzimat days in the middle of the 
nineteenth century, European-type schools began to appear, 
though their number was not large and the system of 
education underwent many ups and downs. But, due to the 
unstable political conditions of the Tanzimat and the 
constitutional period any remarkable progress in this field 
v/as checked. During the Young Turks period education was 
again given its due importance. Not only were the number of 
government schools increased but also the students were 
encouraged to study abroad. Consequently, a number of 
Turkish Muslims began attending the European and American 
schools within the Empire already maintained by the 
missionary agencies. Also remarkable advances were made by 
the Pious Fomdaticns (Awkat) in the religious schools 
maintained by them. This has been aptly described by Halida 
24 Edib thus. 
23. Harry Elisha Allen, The Turkish Transformation 
(Chicago, 1935), p.92. 
24. Memoirs of Halide Edib> (New York, 1926), p.351. 
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"The medresses for the first time were 
to have modern teachers instead of the old 
scholastic curriculum and the teachers. 
The mosque schools, which so far taught 
only the Quran and which were housed in 
little holes, were to modernize, and a 
dozen schools were amalgamated in cne bic, 
and up-to-date building in an important 
center. Each was to have a modern staff 
with a modern curriculum. The boys schools 
were organized by Ali Bey, a very capable 
and progressively section chief in evkaf. 
The girls schools as well as the small mixed 
ones were to be organised by Nakie Hanum 
as the general director." 
Now under the Republic education was taken away from 
the Ulema. All traditional mederses were closed down and 
their place was taken by the government built schools on the 
model of the West. Education was proclaimed to be universal 
and free. The different millets continued to provide 
separate schools, hospitals, and other social institutions 
for those wishing to use them, with the government insisting 
only that all millet children receive their elementary 
education in the state schools or according to curriculum 
established by the Ministry of Education, in order to 
provide the common bonds for them to participate fully in 
Turkish life. 
However, provision was made by the state for further 
training of religious personnel. At the lower level, new 
schools were opened to train the imams and preachers, and at 
the higher level a Faculty of Theology was established 
at the Suleymaniya Mederse which was affiliated to the 
60 
University of Istanbul. Thus religious education was 
brought under the direct control of the Ministry of 
Education. This new faculty was established with an 
intention to serve as the centre of a new, modernised, and 
scientific form of religious instruction which could serve 
the purpose of a secular, westernized republic. 
Education no longer worked to produce good and 
faithful Muslims, but good and faithful Turks. Islam, in 
so far as it could contribute to the new end, was retained, 
but religious instruction was not given by turbaned hojas 
but by the regular secular teachers and was so presented, as 
25 to produce devoted Turks. 
Religion: 
The official religion of the Ottomans was Islam and 
the majority of the Turks were Sunni Muslims and the 
followers of the Hanafi school of Fiqh. In the beginning 
Ataturk definitely had no intention of any break with Islam 
because in the constitution of 1924 article 2 clearly 
specified Islam to be the state religion and included 
references to Allah in the official oath taking. It was 
also a fact that Mustafa Kemal never attacked Islam. 
Infact he was against those Ulema who, through their 
25. H.E. Allen, Op. cit., p. 101. 
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superficial knowledge of Islam, were exploiting the people 
for self aggrandizement. He made frequent references to 
Islam whenever he tried to justify his reforms and the 
programmes of the nationalist government. What he aimed 
at was to limiting the practice of religion within the 
boundaries of the places of worship and also at separating 
religion and state. In this way not only the political and 
social influences of the Ulema were suppressed but also this 
was a step towards reducing the role of religion from social 
and cultural life of the people. It was always explained to 
the people that these reforms were not against Islam but 
just to put an end to the power and influence of the 
27 Ulema. ' 
The second article of the constitution had begun 
with the words « The religion of the Turkish State is Islam. 
On 5 April 1928, the Peoples Party resolved to delete this 
clause from the Turkish constitution, and five days later, 
26. Rashid Feroze. Islam and Secularism in Post Kemalist 
Turkey (Islamabad, 1976), p.98. 
27. Rashid Feroze. Op. cit, , p.110. Bernard Lewis 
writes, 'Mustafa Kemal wanted to break the hold of 
the Ulema. However they still had great power and 
influence. A large part of the educational 
facilities of the country were under their control, 
the law relating to family and personal matters were 
still dominated by the code they administered. 
This was the only authority to challenge the new 
leadership. Infact this was the aspect of the 
conflict. Cf. B. Lewis, Op.cit., pp.258-60. 
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on April 10, the Assembly voted a law to this effect. The 
disestablishment of Islam was completed, and Turkey was now, 
leyally and constitutionally, a lay state, secular, and 
28 
modern in her constitution, laws and aspirations. 
Language: 
The most critical stage in the Turkish transfor-
mation was exemplified best in the adoption of the Latin 
29 
script. There had been proposals for the improvement of 
the Arabic script since the time of the Tanzimat, though 
nothing very much had come of them. The more radical idea 
of abandoning the Arabic script entirely and replacing it by 
the latin alphabet was put forward and discussed in Turkey 
30 in 1923 and 1924, but was decisively rejected. 
The idea of adopting the Latin script for Turkish 
was first raised by the Azerbaijani exiles in Turkey. The 
Azerbaijan Republic had already adopted the Latin script for 
their Turkish in 1925. The next year a congress of 
Turcologists took place in Baku under the auspices of Soviet 
Russia. Regarding the script of the Turkish language the 
congress decided to introduce Latin in place of Arabic 
31 
script m the Turkish languages of Soviet Russia. 
28. Bernard Lewis, Op.cit., p.271 and also S.J. and E.K. 
Shaw, Op.cit., p.378. 
29. Niyazi Berkes, Op.cit., p.476. 
30. B. Lewis, Op.cit., p.271. 
31. Ibid., p.426. 
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Soon after the Soviet decision the Turkish Minister 
of Education suggested the adoption of the Latin script. 
Mustafa Kemal opened a nation wide compaign in August 1928 
and in November the same year a law was passed by the G.N.A. 
making the use of the Latin script for Turkish compulsory 
and prohibiting the use of the Arabic script in all public 
32 
affairs after December 1 of the same year. 
Mustafa Kemal's purpose in changing the alphabet was 
not to prevent Turks from reading the Quran. He wanted to 
reduce illiteracy and develop a uniform and logical Turkish 
language. He rightly concluded that it was easier for Turks 
to learn,to read and write using Latin alphabet. He and the 
members of the assembly each took a black board to the 
villages and towns and proved that the Latin alphabet was an 
easier medium. The introduction of a new alphabet was a 
staggering undertaking in the printing of books for the 
growing schools of the country, but it was done. Turks every 
where knew for the first time how a word was to be 
•3j3 
pronounced from the way it was written."" 
Kemal's nationalist and populist theories demanded 
that the Turkish language should be truly Turkish, with the 
32. Rashid Feroze, Op.cit., p.88 and also N. Berker, 
Op.cit., pp. 474-6. 
33. Y. Armajani and T.M. Ricks, Op.cit,, p.246. 
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disappearance of the existing duality of language those of 
the palace and the people. He, therefore, ordered that all 
34 the Arabic and Persian words should be eliminated, since 
the Turkish language, which had been overwhelmed by such an 
invasion, had been reduced to merely verbs and suffixes in 
literary works. In the words of Mustafa Kemal: 
"The Turkish nation which knew how 
to defend its country and noble indepen-
dence must also liberate its language from 
the yoke of foreign language."35 
At the beginning of the 1930's language reform 
movement was revitalized. Mustafa Kemal invited some of the 
prominent members of the Turkish Historical Congress, held 
at Ankara in July 1932, and suggested to them the 
establishment of a society for the study of the Turkish 
language. As a result, Turkish linguistic society called 
'Turk Dil Kurumu' was formed according to Article 2 of its 
statutes the aim of the society was to bring about the 
genuine beauty and richness of the Turkish language to 
elevate it to the high rank it deserves among world 
languages. To attain this objective a special committee was 
set up for research in linguistics and philosophy, 
34. Because these two languages (Arabic and Persian) 
were considered to be the language of Islam as well 
as of the government. In the Republic of Turkey 
these languages were regarded as national disgrace. 
35. Uriel Heyd, Language Reform in Modern Turkey, 
(Jerusalem 1954), p.9. 
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etymology, yrammer and syntax, vocubulary and terminology, 
the collection of words and publications. In 1932 the first 
Turkish language congress was convened in Istanbul. The 
Congress elected the society's Central Committee which 
decided the following main steps towards speedy reform of 
36 the ordinary-non-technical vecabularies.' 
1. The collection and publication of the Turkish word-
material present in the popular language and old 
texts. 
2. The definition of the principles of wordformation 
in Turkish, and the creation of words from Turkish 
roots in conformity therewith. 
3. The suggestion and propagation of such genuine 
Turkish words as might replace words of foreign 
origin frequently used in Turkish especially in the 
written language. 
In order to enable the society to carry out its work 
the government and the administration fully supported it by 
decreeing in November 1932 for the collection of all such 
Turkish words which were generally in use of the common people 
but not found in the written language. The Turkish 
36. For details regarding the founding of the society 
and its works see Ibid., p.25ff. 
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Linyuistic society turned out ylossary after glossary of 
genuine Turkish terms. Some caught on, many did not. There 
was, in short, failure to expel all foreign words from 
Turkish. The movement was then restrained in accordance with 
newly invented 'Sun Theory of language'. This theory was 
propounded at the Third Turkish language congress held in 
1936. It taught that all languages of mankind were derived 
from Turkish, so that in using any Arabic or Persian word 
they needed, the Turks were only reclaiming their own since 
"•17 they had originally been Turkish words. 
Abolition of the Tekkes: 
There was another group that of the dervishes 
(SufJ3) who had a wider contact with the common people. 
The great reforms of 1924 were directed against the Ulema 
but not the dervishes, but it soon became apparent that 
op 
dervishes were not to be spared. 
On September 2, 1925 two decrees were issued by 
the Assembly, one laid down the final closure of the tekkes 
(Religious orders or Dervish orders) and dissolved the 
congregation, the other designated those members of the 
37. Andrew Mango, Turkey (London, 1968), p.60. 
38. For details regarding the various 'tarikas' and 
their activities see B. Lewis, Op, cit., pp.398 ff. 
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clergy who had the right to use clerical garb and to fill 
the position in the hierarchy of the mosques, and made 
conditions to which their conduct must conform. 
Apart from 'tekkes' there were also 'Turbes' (tomb) 
to which votive offerings were made and which were 
considered miracle working. These were also ordered to be 
closed. A visible reason for their closure may have been 
that their popular support, their radical traditions, 
their masonic organisation all made them to little, amenable 
to state control. Yet another reason for the abolition of 
the dervish orders was the revolt led by Seyh Sait, head of 
the Naqshbandi order in Eastern Anatolia which was severely 
dealt with. A special court known as Independence Tribunal 
39 
condemned the Seyh and forty others to be hanged. 
Adaptation of Turkish Family Names : 
Undoubted one of the more dramatic and publicized 
events was the forced adaptation and use of family names. 
Only a few of the old Turkish families had names, and many 
did not use them. The Grand national Assembly gave to 
Mustafa Kemal the name of Atatiirk (Father of the Turks). 
His close friend and second in command, Ismet, became Ismet 
Inonu, in the honour of his two commemorating victories 
29. Ibid., p.261. 
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over the Greeks at Inonu in 1921. Appropriate names were 
given to other party leaders by G.N.A. The head of each 
family went to precinct police headquarters and selected 
the family names from the list of approved Turkish words and 
names, or a combination of these. No one else in that 
district could take the name. Most names had a meaning, 
such as Biyiklioglu (son of the man with a mustache), 
ustundag (moutaintop), and Kirkagaclio^luCson of the man 
40 
with forty trees). 
Another step taken in this direction was a law 
passed by the G.N.A. shifting the capital from Istanbul to 
Ankara in the Anatolian highlands. It was intended to 
remove the republican government from foreign influences, 
from cosmopolitanism, and from stagnating influence of the 
old Ottoman sultanate and its conservative entourage. Many 
towns were renamed in modern Turkish. Angora became 
Ankara, Smyrna became Izmir and Adrianople became Edirne. 
After 1932, letters addressed with the old names were not 
^ T • ^ 4 1 
delivered. 
40. Sydney N. Fisher, The Middle East ; A History, (New 
York, 1960), p.397. 
41. Don Peretz, Op.cit,, p.154. 
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CHAPTER - V 
POPULISM (Halkcilik) 
Populism was one of the three fundamental principles 
(Republicanism and Nationalism being the other two) accepted 
initially by the Republicans' People's Party as early as in 
1920. According to this principle, the country was composed 
not of social classes but individuals who belonged to 
various occupational groups. The establishment of more than 
one political party was denied on the assumption that there 
was identity of economic interest among the populace and 
that Turkey lacked large well differentiated social classes 
with specific interests of their own to be defended in 
separate political parties. The striking aspect of the 
agreement for the rejection of multiparty_ system lies in its 
temporary nature. In other words, if social classes came 
into existence and developed economic interests of their 
own, there would then be no justification for continuing the 
non-party system. 
The idea of a government based on the people's 
sovereignty, which had been at the basis of the nationalist 
movement and of the Grand National Assembly, was embodied in 
populism. It was, however, a fictitious sovereignty, for 
1. K.H. Karpat, Op.cit., p.308. 
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there was hardly any means through which people could 
effectively exercise that sovereignty and have a voice in 
changing the government. Populism was not a theory for the 
justification of revolutionary social changes, but the 
adaptation of Western ideas of democracy to domestic needs; 
it was the "nation's conscience," and a means of securing 
social unity around the ideals of nationalism. The 
fundamental social structure was to be preserved, and the 
social, political, and economic developments were supposed 
to take place upon the basis of the existing social 
organization. It was implicitly accepted, therefore, that 
social differentiation would continue in the same old 
pattern, and that whatever changes that might occur in the 
social structure were to be the natural result of this 
2 
evolution rather than of revolution. 
Populism emerged as the most powerful ideological 
feature of the liberation movement. After the final rupture 
with the Istanbul government in the spring of 1920, the 
nationalist leaders began to rely much more on the masses, 
and their attitude and speeches acquired distinct populist 
agalitarian overtones. The fact that the nationalists 
established relations with and accepted material and moral 
support from Bolshevik government strengthened the populist 
2. D.E. Webster, Op.cit., pp. 165-166. 
71 
and anti-imperialist features of the Turkish revolution, but 
3 
without turning it into an ideology of the class struggle. 
Mustafa Kemal used populism as a major ideological 
instrument in forging the alliance of the elites and civil 
elites. However he developed this principle according to 
the changing political circumstances. In its initial stage, 
he presented populism as a way of overcoming the gap between 
bureaucracy and the people, since in Turkey the dominant 
4 
class was not that of capitalists but that of bureaucrats. 
In the Turkish Republic, Article 69 of the 
constitution states that all Turks are equal before the law 
and all the "privileges of whatever description claimed by 
the groups, classes, families, and individuals are abolished 
and forbidden." It was this idea that Mustafa Kemal 
incorporated in the word populism. 
3. K.H. Karpat, "The Evolution of the Turkish Political 
System and the Changing Meaning of Modernity, 
Secularism and Islam (1876-1948)", Islamic Culture, 
Vol. LIX, No.4, 1985, p.393. 
4. Ali Kazancigii, "The Ottoman-Turkish State and 
Kemalism" in Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Ozbudun, 
Op.cit., p.51. 
5. S.N. Fisher, Op.cit., p.395. 
12 
This idea had various manifestations. One was that 
all citizens of the Republic were equal regardless of 
class, rank, religion or occupation. So it was that the 
1924 constitution specified that "The people of Turkey 
regardless of religion and race, are Turks as regards 
citizenship" (Article 88). Every Turk , regardless of 
origin, was given the same right to practice "the philoso-
phical creed, religion or doctrine to which he may adhere" 
(Article 75). Citizens, therefore, could no longer be given 
different rights and positions according to their millets. 
The Millet, the concept originally referred to the 
various religious subdivisions of the Empire but 
in this particular case to the Muslim Community, 
would re-establish its sovereign right as the 
fountainhead of legitimacy. In fact, since the end 
of the nineteenth century millet had been used with 
increasing frequency to translate the word 'Nation'. 
Its meaning was therefore, ambiguous. It is as a 
consequences of this ambiguity that the body which 
had been assembled in Ankara as a representative 
assembly and which had a strong clerical 
representation in it, passed Article 1 of the 
Provisional Constitution proposed in 1920 without 
any objection (January 20, 1920). This article 
stated that sovereignty belonged without reservation 
to the millet. The ambiguity of the term allowed 
clerics to believe that what had been invoked were 
the rights of the community, whereas for Atatlirk it 
was a preparation for invoking the sovereignty of 
the nation. See ^erif Mardin, "Religion and 
Secularism in Turkey", in Ali Kazancigil & Ergun 
Ozbudun, Op.cit., p.209. 
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Populism is the basic principle of the Turkish 
de;mocracy. In September 1921, Mustafa Kemal's populism 
m^ inifested a certain socialist inspiration, he defined his 
government as the 'People's government'. Speaking in 
g 
Ankara on December 1, 1921, he said: 
"If we must define our government, 
sociologically, we would call it 
'people's government'.... We are 
toiling people, poor people, who 
worked to save their lives and 
independence.. . . Populism is a social 
principle that seeks to rest the 
social order on its work and its laws. 
Gentleman] We are the men who follow 
a principle that entitles us, in order 
to preserve this right and to 
safeguard our independence, to 
struggle as a whole nation against the 
imperialism that seeks to crush and 
the capitalism that seeks to swallow 
our very nationalhood... that is the 
basis on which our government rests, a 
clear sociological basis.... But what 
can we do if we do not resemble 
democracy, we don't resemble 
socialism, we don't resemble anything? 
Genetlemen, we should be proud of 
defying comparison! Because, gentlemen, 
we resemble ourselves." 
7. If one interprets it as meaning the governance 'of 
the people, with the people, for the people. 
'People' in the Ottoman Empire had no political 
value. Therefore, the terms 'reaya' was first used 
to define the majority of the Ottoman, earning 
their living from farming. As time passed on, this 
word started to be used only to describe non-Muslims. 
During the Tanzimat the 'halk' (people) started to 
be meaningful besides the word ahali (gathering or 
crowd). It was with the Turkish revolution that the 
word 'People' gained a political meaning. Atatlirk 
used the word 'halk' rather than millet, to indicate 
no trace of a religious cannotation. See Ibid,,p.l9. 
8. Bernard Lewis, Op.cit., pp. 458-59. 
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Mustafa Kemal personally remained faithful to the 
principle of "popular sovereignty" despite the fact that it 
was, inpractice, mainly ignored - and in all his speeches he 
always described the nation as being the source of all power 
and himself as a servant of the national will. These 
sincere utterings were addressed at least in part to the 
Republican People's Party itself, for the truth was that by 
1930 the party had already achieved full control of the 
National Assembly and the government, and at times could 
defy even Mustafa Kemal. 
Since in the beginning the national struggle was 
against imperialism and anti-capitalism, which sought to 
destroy the Turkish nation, therefore, in February 1923, 
his populism was of a solidaritist kind, mainting that in 
c. class ridden society such as Turkey,., social development 
should be through a solidarity division of labour which would 
benefit everyone. The most unusual aspect of populism lies 
in the fact that it envisaged social relations in the light 
of class struggle, which it seemed to accept as inevitable. 
Finally the populism of 1931, as defined in the Republican 
People's Party programme was "the means of preserving the 
unity of Turkish society by not yielding to class struggle 
and also stated that populism was the rejection of class-
struggle. 
9. K.H. Karpat, Op.cit., p.405. 
10. K.H. Karpat, Turkey's Politics, p.52. 
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Legal issues played a far more crucial role in the 
creation of the modern Turkish State than perhaps in the 
case of any other country. Due to the patrimonial 
background of the State elites, there existed a tendency to 
see socio-political issues as legal problems. In a speech 
at the opening of the new Law School in Ankara in 1925, 
Atatiirk declared that 'the greatest ... enemies of the 
revolutionaries are rotten laws and their descript 
upholder. Soon however, such anti-capitalist overtones 
were dropped. In later years populism came to mean only 
popular sovereignty and equality before the law, as well as 
a rejection of the class conflict. Thus the Republican 
People's Party's programme, adopted at the Fourth Party 
12 Congress in May 1935, defined populism as follows. 
"The source of will and 
sovereignty is the nation. The party 
considers it an important principle 
that this will and sovereignty be 
used to regulate the proper fulfil-
ment of the mutual duties of the 
citizen to the State and of the State 
to the citizen. We consider the 
individuals who accept an absolute 
equality before the law, and who 
recognise no privileges for any 
individual, family, class, or 
community to be ... pupulist. 
11. Bernard Lewis, Op.cit., p.268. 
12. Official translation quoted by Suna Kili, Kemalism 
(Islanbul, 1969), p.78. Cf. Ergugun Ozbudun, "The 
nature of the Kemalist political regime", in Ali 
Kazancigil & Ergun Ozbudun, Op.cit., p.88. 
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It is one of our main principles to 
consider the people of the Turkish 
Republic, not as composed of 
different classes, but as a community 
divided into various professions 
accordiny to the requirements of the 
division of labour for the individual 
and social life of the Turkish 
people. The farmers, handicraftsmen, 
labourers and workmen, people 
exercising free professions, indus-
trialists, merchants, and public 
servants are the main group of work 
constituting the Turkish Community. 
The aims of our Party ... are to 
secure social order and solidarity 
instead of class conflict, and to 
establish harmony of interests. The 
benefits are to be proportionate to 
the aptitude to the amount of work." 
The people's constitutional right in Turkey 
paralleled those of Western democracies, "Every Turk is born 
free, and free he lives". So read Article 68 of the Turkish 
Constitution, and the next twenty articles guaranteed 
equality before the law regardless of race or creed, 
freedom of conscience, thought, speech, press, association 
and contract, inviolability of life, honour, residence, and 
property, privacy of telegraphic and telephonic 
communication, freedom of complaint to properly constituted 
authorities, prohibition of physical abuse, forced labour or 
undur confiscation of property, tax levies only in 
accordance with law, and universal compulsory free primary 
13 
education. 
13. E. Bisbee, Op.cit., p.213. 
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Soon after adopting populism as the basic principle 
of the new government, Mustafa Kemal introduced certain 
populist measures in order to bring the government closer 
to the masses. In the following a few of those policies and 
measures taken in that direction are discussed. 
Agrarian Reforms; 
During the 1920's two measures of great importance 
were taken, both of them in the field of agrarian reforms. 
The first of these was the abolition of the tithes (Osijr) . 
The tax burden upon the Turkish peasant had always been 
inordinately heavy. This tax, with its roots going back to 
the medieval Islamic fiscal system^ had become a serious 
abuse, irregular in its incidence and often greatly 
exceeding the legal tenth. The tax was calculated on the 
gross product, and not subject to any allowances. Providing 
a large part of revenues of the state, it had constituted a 
heavy burden on the peasantry. Kemal Atatiirk promised them 
in an earlier speech relief on this score in payment for 
their efforts in the national struggle. 
Until 19 25 the peasants had paid an annual tieth to the 
equivalent to 12.5 per cent of his product. This was 
abolished by the G.N.A. and partially replaced by a sales 
tax which was applied only to the produce marketed outside 
the producer's villa9e and shipped by sea or rail. After 
its abolition, the gap in the state finance was filled by an 
increase in the income from monopolies - tobacco, matches, 
alcohol - which were the major sources of state revenue. 
The other major reforms under took by the Republican 
were in landownership. The introduction of Swiss code in 
1926 had unified and modernized the system of land tenure, 
thus legally terminating such traces of feudalism as 
remained in the country. Ataturk tried to eliminate the 
feudal institution through some more or less formal legal 
reforms. Ataturk frequently declared that agrarian reforms 
were necessary and it would not be advisable to limit the 
size of private land ownership in order to achieve them. 
He said : 
"First of all, it is necessary 
that no peasant be left landless in 
our country. More important than that 
is to provide for a statute to 
prevent the parcelling of land and 
keep it large enough to provide a 
living for the peasants family. It 
is necessary to limit the size of 
land ownership according to the 
fertility of land and the density of 
the population in the region." 
14. William Hale, The Political and Economical Develop-
ment of Modern Turkey, (London, 1981), p.43. 
15. Bernard Lewis, Op.cit., p.461. 
16. Cf. Kenan Bulutoglu, "Ataturk and his Economic 
Policy" Kemal H. Karpot,ed.Political and 
Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East, 
(New York, 1982), p.411. 
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Land distribution laws were passed in 1927 and 1929, 
but progress was very slow, and between 1923 and 1934 only 
771,000 hectares of lands was distributed. The most 
important distributions were in the eastern provinces where, 
in addition to its social policies, the government was 
anxious to break the power of feudal on tribal chiefs that 
had led the rebellion of 1925. •'"^  
Equality and Social Justice; 
Article 88 shows that "the people of Turkey, 
regardless of religion and race, are Turks as regards 
citizenship." Citizen therefore, could no longer be given 
different rights and positions according to their millets. 
While Lausanne essentially confirmed the autonomy of the 
latter, the pomise of equality under the Republic was 
sufficient to convince the Jews to renounce their separate 
legal status and rights (October 8, 1925), the Armenians 
followed three weeks later and the Greeks, after much more 
debate, on January 7, 1926. A further step towards equality 
came in 1928 when the articles of the 1924 constitution 
specifying Islam as the State region, including reference 
to Allah in the official oath and requiring the Grand 
National Assembly to enforce the Seriat, were replaced by 
17. B. Lewis, Op. cit., p.461. 
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articles separating religion and state and declaring the 
Turkish Republic a secular State. Since then the non-
Muslim religions have had full legal equality in the 
Turkish Republic. 
The second basic promise of populism involved 
government by and for the people. Judicial functions were 
carried out in the name of the Assembly, in accordance with 
the law, by the courts that were independent of it. At 
first the vote was given only to every male aged 18 or over, 
but in 1934 women also were given the right to vote and 
serve as deputies. The constitution provided that "judges 
are independent in the conduct of trials and in the 
rendering of their judgement. They shall be protected from 
all sorts of intervention and are subject only to the law. 
Neither the G.N.A. nor the cabinet may modify, alter, delay 
II 
or influence the execution of their judgement (article 54). 
Every person could use all legal means needed to defend his 
19 
rights before the courts. 
In August 1924, the first anniversary of the victory 
of Sakaria - Kemal spoke thus: 
18. S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw, Op.cit., pp.378-379 
19. Ibid., p.380. 
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"Speaking of civilization let me 
stress one point - that the basis of 
progress and strength is family life. 
Worries in the'life of the family are 
bound to cause calamities in the 
economic and political life of the 
country. It is necessary that Men and 
Woman who form the family, enjoy the 
natural rights and fulfil the same 
obligations." 
Sixteen days after this speech a commission of 
jurists met and started work on the new civil code which was 
to replace the Islamic ^eriat. A year later, Kemal 
proclaimed at Inerbolu that the emancipation of women would 
form one of the basic principles of the Republic, and in 
1926 the Swiss civil code was translated into Turkish with 
slight modifications and accepted as the Republic's own 
21 
civil code. With this law Turkish women became a useful 
members of the society. 
Polygamy was abolished and the equality of women was 
established under the civil law. Women inherited equally 
with men, and all branches of commerce and instruction were 
opened to them. As regards their political rights, however, 
they did enjoy equal rights with men at least in the 
22 
beginning, for the right to vote was still denied to them. 
20. Philip Paneth, Turkey Decadence and Rebirth (London, 
1943), p.125. 
21. H. Malik Evrenol, Revolutionary Turkey, (Ankara, 
1936), p.7. 
22. A pro-Kemalist writer however says, "the vote is not 
of great importance under the one party system. It 
may be for this reason that women of Turkey were 
first given the right to vote for the People's Party 
at municipal elections in 1930. See, Philip Paneth, 
Loc.cit. 
82 
They were given this fundamental prerogative in 1934 
when the Turkish law was amended and the Turkish women were 
granted the right not only to vote but also the right to be 
elected members in the Turkish Parliament. Incidently 
women were also made subject to conscription. In short, 
there remain no branch of activity in which women were not 
^ J 23 
represented. 
Free and Universal Education: 
Education was another area here revolutionary 
changes had to be made. The government of Atatlirk took up 
this field as a measure for social welfare. The Provisional 
Government set up by the Grand National Assembly, considered 
a drastic change in the organized education of the country 
as of primary importance. The Grand National Assembly had 
made this change part of its definite plan. Immediately 
after the declaration of the Turkish Republic, a bill 
concerning abolition of the Medreses, the theological 
senimaries, was presented to the Assembly for discussion and 
approval. These were important moments and handling of the 
matter was not easy. But with the approval of the bill on 
secularization of education in Turkey on March 3, 1924, the 
religious seminaries were abolished and received their final 
23. Ibid. 
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death blow and were closed for ever. With this the 
24 
foundation of modern education was laid m Turkey. 
Free and universc'il education was established as 
another expression of Populism. First of all primary 
education in government-sponsored schools became obligatory. 
In conformity with the constitutional law for universal 
education, schools were built by the thousands during this 
era of Turkish history. Emphasis was placed on teacher 
training schools, since lack of teachers handicaped the 
programme success. Each village was required to have a 
25 primary school of five grades. According to a law, each 
village had to build its own school and employ its teachers, 
Later on, it was decided to build a consolidated school 
system for which the joint efforts of several villages would 
be required. Secondary schools were constructed in the 
towns to prepare students for various vocations. For higher 
education the University of Istanbul and later, Ankara 
27 University were established. 
24. H. Malik Evrenol, Op.cit., pp. 47-48. 
25. Sydney Nettleton Fisher, Op.cit., p.395 
26. H. Malik Evrenol, Op.cit., p.58. 
27. Sydney N.F., Loc.cit. 
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The development of Professional and Technical 
schools was strongly emphasized by the government. Experts 
from Europe and America were invited and employed to make 
careful studies on the possibilities of developing the 
necessary technical schools in Turkey. The Bureau of 
Industrial and Professional Education established by the 
Ministry of Education in 1926 dealt entirely with trade and 
28 
technical schools in the country. 
28. H. Malik Evrenol, Op.cit., p.57. 
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CHAPTER - VI 
SECULARISM (Layiklik) 
One of the distinguishing features of the Kemalist 
revolution from those of the other modernising movements in 
the Islamic World is the extent to which secularism was 
emphasized in republican Turkey. Turkey remains today the 
only Islamic country whose constitution stipulates that 
secularism is one of the basic organisational principles of 
the State. The principle of Secularism had emerged in the 
Otoman Empire as a practical necessity, and a preamble for 
modernization. This now became one of the pillars of the 
2 
new government. The fundamental ingredient of secularism 
is the separation of state from religion. This idea got its 
root in the medieval European history when state and church 
went hand in hand. The earliest proponents of secularism 
tried to separate the state from the church. For a long 
time the idea of secularism served as a conceptual basis for 
those modernist who tried to lessen the role of religion in 
the state affairs. The Ottoman Empire, like any other 
1. Ali Kazancigil and Orgun Ozbudun, Op.cit., p.3. 
2. Kemal H. Karpat, Op.cit., p.271.-
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medieval empires combined church with the state. Mustafa 
Kemal and the ideology of Kemalism considered this 
phenomenon as the basic cause of all problems in the Ottoman 
3 
Empire whether ethnic, social or political. Secularism 
involved not just separation of the state from the 
Institution of Islam but also liberation of the individual 
mind from the restraints imposed by the traditional Islamic 
concept and practices, and modernization of all aspects of 
state and society that had been moulded by Islamic 
traditions and ways t "It was on the line of this princi-
ple that the abolition of Sultanate, Caliphate the office 
of the Seyhul-Islam and a series of other reforms ending the 
Union of the State and religion, the chief characteristics 
of the Ottoman Empire, were abolished. It was a rationalist 
scientific anti-traditionalist, and anti-clerical 
4 
philosophy. The principle of secularism as developed by 
the Turkish ideologues is more extensive than its Western 
version. Aside from the liberation of legislative, 
executive and judiciary from religious influence, it expects 
to restrict the entire tradition in the life of the nation 
be it social, individual or family activities in the name of 
religion. 
3. S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw, Op.cit., p.384. 
4' A.A. Adivar, "The Interaction of Islamic and Western 
Thought in Turkey" in T. Cuyler Young ed. Near 
Eastern Culture and Society (Princeton,1951),p.128. 
5. Enver Ziya Karal, Op.cit., p.22. 
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In the early days of the resolution Kemal Ataturk 
did not use the term secularism though he strictly adhered 
to their idea, perhaps because of the obvious reason of not 
risking the amalgonism of the masses. He wanted to 
secularise the state and society in every respect. 
The principle of secularism was implemented by 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in all aspects of life. Not only in 
government institutions was this idea implemented every 
effort was made that secularismwas reflected in the fields of 
social life, culture, language, literature and in day to day 
life. To achieve this object a number of steps were taken 
to first secularize the state itself. Thus first of all the 
Sultanate and then the Caliphate was abolished. Mustafa 
Kemal showed mixed attitude in this regard. Some 
institutions were secularized whereas some 
institution were secularized in phases. 
Abolition of the Sultanate; 
From 1919 to 1922, the period of occupation of 
Constantinople by the allied troops, the sultan's government 
had neither any revenue nor any army, and he was for all 
practical purposes a prisoner, still his political intrigues 
never ceased and he never thought for a moment to reconcile 
6. Ibid., pp. 2 2-23. 
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7 himself with the Angora government. The final clash 
between the two was precipitated by the Allies, who still 
insisted on recognizing the Sultan's government in 
Istanbul, and invited them as well as the nationalists 
8 9 
to the peace conference at Lausanne. Sultan Wahetuttin 
remained astir making intrigues to interpose and create 
difficulties in the working of the machinery of peace. 
The British refused to recognise the nationalist government 
as the sole representative of the nation. The Sultan's 
government had been invited to be represented at the 
Laussanne Conference. Rafet Pasa compelled the sultan to 
withdraw its acceptance of the invitation, and thus left the 
sultan's government completely in the blank. The mistake 
7. Mohammad Barakatullah, Op.cit., p.9. 
8. For more detail see below Chapter Ilnd. 
9. In 1918 Sultan Mehmet Resat, properly known as 
Mehmet V., was succeeded by his brother Sultan 
Wahetuttin, known as Mehmer VI. 
10. Mohammad Barakatullah, Op.cit., p. 9-10. 
11. Harry Luke, The Old Turkey and the New, (London, 
1955), p.165. 
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committed by the British proved fatal to the Sultanate. 
Mustafa Kemal had made his decision. The sultanate and the 
caliphate had to be separated and the former abolished. 
From now onwards there was to be no Sultan but an Ottoman 
prince would hold office as caliph only, with religious but 
not political powers. By this compromise Mustafa Kemal hoped 
to disarm the opposition of the religious elements to 
political change, to retain the advantages of a legitimate 
and revered authority above politics, and at the same time 
12 
to end the personal autocracy of the Sultan. 
On November 1, 1922 Mustafa Kemal proposed the 
abolition of the Sultanate. In a long speech vividly 
describing the history of the evolution of the Caliphate and 
Sultanate he claimed that the two could be separated as they 
had been in history, and that the latter could be abolished 
while retaining the former. The Sultan was but temporal 
13 
soveriegnty and that had been taken over by the people. 
The Grand National Assembly passed a law on 1st 
November, 1922 deposing Sultan Mehmet VI and voiding all 
laws of his government. The resolution passed by G.N.A. 
contained two articles. The first declared that the Turkish 
people consider that the form of government in Istanbul 
12. Bernard Lewis, Op.cit., p.252. 
13. Niyazi Berkes, Op.cit., p. 449-50. 
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renting on the soveriegnty of an individual had ceased to 
exist in March 1920 and from now on was history, the second 
recognized that the caliphate belonged to the Ottoman House 
but laid down that the caliphate rested on the Turkish 
state, and that the Assembly would choose as caliph that 
member of the Ottoman House who was in learning and 
14 
character most worthy and befitting. 
The Ottoman Empire was liquidated juridically on 
October 29, 1923, when the Turkish National Assembly passed 
a law proclaiming Turkey to be a Republic. The last Ottoman 
Sultan Vehetuttin (1918-22) had gone into exile on November 
17, 1922. The Turkish Grand National Assembly had appointed 
his cousin Abdiil Mecit a succer to Sultan Vahituttin on 
November 18, 1922 in the capacity of the Caliph of Islam. 
Abolition of the Caliphate; 
The abolition of Sultanate was only one step towards 
the complete secularization of the state that Mustafa Kemal 
had in mind. The only delay was that he wanted to move step 
by step in a phased manner. He closely watched the reaction 
of the abolition of the Suntanate which he found out was not 
14. Ahsanullah, History of the Islamic World, (New 
Delhi, 1986), p.152, and see also Bernard Lewis, 
Op. cit., pp.253-54. 
15. Kemal H. Karpat ed., The Ottoman Empire and its 
place in the World History, p.18. 
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indicative of any risk or trouble for his government and 
programme. It was logical that he would not tolerate a 
second centre of power within his country. He started 
sending feelers to this effect. Soon it had become public 
knowledge what he intended several members of G.N.A. also 
started issuing statemetns demanding the abolition of the 
Caliphate probably on the instructions of Atatlirk himself. 
Several newspapers wrote against the G.N.A.'s intention to 
declare Turkey a republic and to abolish the Caliphate. 
On November 24, 1923, Ismet Pasa received two letters from 
the two eminent Indian Muslim leaders, Agha Khan and Bayed 
Ameer Ali, which was published in major Istanbul dailies, 
emphasizing that the Caliphate be placed on a basis that 
would command the esteem of Muslims universally. 
Mustafa Kemal seized upon the opportunity and 
prepared the ground. The Caliph gave statements to the press 
emphasizing the need for the preservation of the Caliphate, 
and explaining the anxiety of millions of Muslims. He 
17 
asserted that he would not resign from the Caliphate. 
The Caliph, Abdiil Mecit soon become the focalpoint for the 
opponents of the new regime, who wanted to re-establish the 
sultanate and the Caliphate. 
16. R.H. Davison, Turkey, Op.cit., p.129. 
17. M. Rashid Feroz, Islam and Secularism in Post-
Kemalist Turkey (Islamabad, 1976), p.84. 
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The Caliph wrote to Kemal demanding increased 
1 8 privileges but Kemal retored. 
"Let the Caliph and the whole 
world know that the Caliph and the 
Caliphate which have been preserved 
have no real meaning and no real 
existence. We cannot expose the 
Turkish Republic to any sort of 
danger to its independence by its 
continued existance. The position of 
Caliphate in the end has for us no 
more importance than a historic 
memory." 
The Grand National Assembly gave its approval to the 
abolition of the Caliphate on March 3, 1924 and also ordered 
the expulsion of all the male and female members of the 
19 House of Osman. The next morning at day break the unhappy 
Abdul Mecit was packed into a car and driven to a railway 
station to board the orient express not the main Sirkeci 
Station, where his departure might have provoked 
demonstrations, but a small one out side the city. The last 
of the Caliphs had followed the last of the Sultans into 
.^  20 
exile. 
18. One-fifth of the members of Grand National Assembly 
were declared cleric. Many of Ataturk associates 
wanted a liberal but Islamic State, Yahya Armajani, 
Op.cit., p.245 and see Niit'iik, vol.11, p.846-48, 
cited by S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw, Op.cit., p.368-69. 
19. G. Jaschke, "Turkey since the Armistic of Mudros", 
in Neuzeit Part III (E.J. "Brill, 1959), p.36. 
20. B. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Op.cit., 
p. 259. 
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Abolition of the Seriat: 
Till the mid nineteenth century the seriat was 
supreme throughout the Ottoman Empire. But the Tanzimat 
reforms of Sultan Abdul Mecit was the first significant 
move towards modification of the religious law. These codes 
were superimposed on the Seriat law, and the modifications 
were made in favour of the existing Muslim customs. But 
the most significant codification was done in 1876, known as 
27 Majalla (Mecelle). 
26. For example the panel code imposed payment of blood 
money in addition to prison sentence in case of 
bodily injury or homicide, and a man was allowed to 
go unpunished for killing a female relative 
discovered in the act of adultery. Cf. Thomas D. 
Roberts & Others, Area Hand Book for the Republic of 
Turkey, (Washington, 1970), p.367. 
27. This was a compilation of Hanafi law of personal 
obligation, but unlike the other codes, it was not 
regarded as exclusive of the religious law it 
compiled. It was applied in the Secular Courts 
wnich had been instituted to carry out the new 
codes. For details see. S. Mahmassani, Falsafat 
al-Tashri Fi-al-Islam, Eng. trs. Farhat J. Zaidah, 
The Philosophy of Jurisprudence in Islam (Leiden, 
1961), p.39 ff. See also Majid Khadduri and Herbert 
J. Liebesny (ed.). Law in the Middle East, vol.1, 
Origin and Development of Islamic Law (Washington, 
1955), p. 292ff. 
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The abolition of the sultanate and the caliphate did 
not effect the daily life of the average Turk. The end of 
the caliphate, however, marked the beginning of far-
reaching reforms that affected every individual and rocked 
the country. One of the most important of these was the 
abolition of the Seriat . Although in its first 
constitution, the Grand National Assembly had accepted 
Islam as the State religion but it was removed only after 
? 8 
two years. 
In 1926, of all the reforms after the revolution 
the replacement of Seriat by the Western legal codes was the 
most revolutionary one. In February 1926, the new code, 
was adopted by the Grand National Assembly. The adaptation 
of the Swiss civil code, a new penal code from Italy and a 
new Commercial Code based on Germany and Italy were the 
means of fulfiling the utlimate goal of a modern secular 
Turkish State. The then Minister of Justice Mehmut Essat is 
29 
said to have declared on the question. 
28. Niyazi Berkes, Op.cit., p.467. 
2 9 . C.L. Ostrorog, The Angora Reforms (London, 1 9 2 7 ) , 
p . 8 7 f . 
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"We are badly in want of a good 
scientific code. Why waste our time 
trying to produce something new when 
quite good codes are to be found 
readymade? Moreover, what is the 
use of a code without good 
commentaries for a new code? We 
dispose neither of the necessary time 
nor of the necessary precedents in 
practice. The only thing to do is to 
take a good ready-made code to which 
good commentaries exist, and 
translate them wholesale. The Swiss 
Code is a good Code, I am going to 
have it adopted, and I shall ask the 
assembly to proceed to a vote enbloc, 
as Nepoleon had his code voted. If 
it had to be discussed article by 
article. We should never get 
through". 
The new legal system obviously became more 
palatable when identified as the Turkish (rather than the 
Swiss) Civil Code and the Turkish (rather than the Italian) 
30 Criminal Code. Only those who had studied western law 
could pass the bar examination. Practically all of the 
31 
schools for the teaching of Islamic law were closed. 
Even before the final abolition of the Seriat , a law school 
was opened in Ankara in November 1925. Mustafa Kemal had 
32 
remakred that: 
30. D.A. Rustow, Politics and Islam in Turkey 1920-1955, 
(Princeton, 1955), p.81. 
31. Y. Armajani & T.M. Ricks, Op.cit., p.245-46. 
32. Jorge B. Villalta, Ataturk, Eng. trs. W. Campbell. 
(Ankara, 1979), p.365. 
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"The most important thing is to 
liberate our conception of Justice, 
and our legal institution and laws 
from the bonds which hold us under 
their influence, consciously or 
unconsciously, and which are 
incompatible with the needs of the 
century." 
The law school was intended to be not merely the 
training ground of high official and legal specialist but, 
more important, the basis of a new Jurisdiction consistent 
with the revolutionary ideals and in harmony with the social 
33 
needs of new Turkey. 
The Christian and Jewish millets were governed by 
their own religious laws upto that time. After the 
acceptance of the new civil-code, the non-Muslim minorities 
to whom article 28 of the treaty of Lausanne had given 
autonomy in family and personal matters, decided to give up 
that prerogative, since the Muslim religious legislation 
had disappeared and the new laws offered the fullest 
33. A.J. Toynbee & Kirkwood, op.cit., p.202.„ 
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34 guarantees. Thus the Millet system completely disappeared 
and for the first time all the groups were governed by the 
fsame law. 
34. The word Millet is an Arabic word for which there is 
no equivalent in Western political terminology. The 
Millet were actually the members of the non-MUslim 
religious communities living in the Ottoman Empire 
who had already been granted a wide scope of 
cultural and civil autonomy by Mehmet,. the 
Conqueror. First in importance among these Millets 
was the Millet i-Rum which comprised all the Greek 
Orthodox Christian sibjects of the Sultan. The next 
in importance were the Armenian Millet, the Jewish 
Millet, the Roman Catholic Millet and the Maronite 
Millet . . . Lord Duf f erin said . . . All over the 
Turkish period religious communities (Millets) were 
considered as individual nationalities. Thus the 
line of demarcation was not along racial but along 
religious lines. The political identity of the 
Sultan's subjects was Ottoman (Osmanli) and his 
'Nationality' was the religion to which he 
belonged. See Z.N. Zeine Arab-Turkish Relations and 
the Emergence of Arab Nationalism (Beirut, 1958), 
p.28, For a description of Millet System see H.A.R. 
Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the 
West, Vol. I, Part II (London, 1957), pp.207-61. 
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Abolition of the Islamic Calender! 
In the year 1926 the Muslim Candendar for legal, 
official and every day use was abandoned and replaced by 
the Western Gregorian Calendar. Every where, the Muslim 
year of 1342 became 1926, although the Muslim Calendar was 
still used in calculating Ramadhan, the month of fasting 
and religious holidays. The country also began to use the 
international designation for time, instead of the hours of 
the day and sunset. Yet another change in this regard was 
that concerning the weekly holiday. This was affected in 
1935. The weekly holiday on Friday was dropped and instead 
. 35 it was fixed from 1.00 P.M. Saturday until Monday morning. 
Abolition of the Fez: 
The early measures of Mustafa Kemal towards 
secularization aroused widespread opposition among many 
conservatives and traditionalists but Mustafa Kemal took 
little notice of the popular opposition to his 
secularization programme and pressed it on with even greater 
36 
vigour. 
The most astonishing of Mustafa Kemal's reforms was 
the law of 1925 better known as the hat law. During the 
35. Rashid Feroze, Op.cit., p.91. 
36. S.J. Shaw & E.K. Shaw, Op.cit., 385. 
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month of AU9USt 1925, Mustafa Kemal paid an official visit 
to the Black sea coastal region. Addressing an open air 
meeting at Kastmonu. He pointed out that the traditional 
Anatolian male attire of full gown and baggy trousers took 
for more material than a suit of European cut, while Fez, 
with its skull-cap beneath and its cloths wrapped round, 
was far more expensive than a European hat. After a few 
days, at Inebolu in a speech, he said "We are going to 
adopt the civilized international mode of dress 
including a head-dress with a brim, this I wish to say 
37 
openly. The name of this head dress is hat". 
Shortly after this Black sea tour, all government 
officials were ordered to replace their Fezzes by 'hat'. 
On October 25, 1925 a law was passed compelling all male 
citizens to wear hats with effect from November 28. The 
wearing of the Fez became and remained a penishable 
op 
offence. By this act he intended to symbolise the 
modernisation of Turkey. However, this act received even 
wider critici m than more fundamental reform legislation. 
The Fez was compatible with the Muslim practice in a way 
37. G.L. Lewis,op.cit91-92. 
38. Ibid., p.94. 
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that the hat was not, since, during prayers in prostrating 
the forehead touched the ground whereas the hat presented a 
problem. But the Turks changed and prayers were performed 
39 
either with a bare head or with a capturned backward. 
Abolition of the Veil: 
It is also a fact that Mustafa Kemal never attacked 
Islam. Infact, he was against those ulema who, though 
their superficial knowledge of Islam, were exploiting the 
people for self aggrandizement. He made frequent references 
to Islam whenever he tried to justify his reforms and the 
40 programme, of the nationalist government. He believed 
that the essence of civilization, and the basis of strength 
and progress lies in family life. The male and female 
element which comprise the family must have possession of 
their natural rights in order to perform their family 
^ ^- 41 duties. 
39. Y. Armajani & T.M. Ticks, Op.cit., P,247. 
40. In beginning Ataturk definitely had no intention of 
any break with Islam because in the 1924 
constitution article 2 clearly specified Islam to be 
the State religion and included reference to Allah 
in official oath taking. See in Rashid Feroz,p.98. 
41. Ercumend Kuran, The Reforms of Ataturk (RCD Cultural 
Institute Publication no.46, n.d.), p.7. 
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In order to make these thoughts practical he did 
attack, but never outlawed, the Muslim custom of veiling of 
women. The use of veil was discouraged, particularly in the 
cities, but it never was actually made illegal. Muslim women 
now began to expose themselves in beauty contests, and in 
42 
1929 the first Turkish beauty queen was chosen. Further, 
women were accorded full and equal right of franchise. They 
were permitted first not only to vote but later on to be 
elected first in the municipal elections in 1930, then the 
village council of elder in 1933 and finally in the national 
election for G.N.A. in 1934. They were admitted in the 
public schools, the civil services, and the professions on 
43 
an increasingly equal basis along with men. 
42. Niyazi Berkes, op.cit., p.472. 
43. Ibid. 
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CHAPTER - VII 
ETATISM (Devlet^ilik) 
When the Turkish Republic came into being in 1923, 
the most urgent problem it had to face was that of economic 
development. Due to the large scale war from 1911 onwards 
national economy had collapsed. As soon as the Republic was 
free to direct attention to internal reconstruction 
especially in the field of economic development, it found 
itself tackling with three major obstacles. The first a 
deficiency of experience and knowledge in the field of 
economy; second the great mass of peasants, with a very 
high percentage of illiteracy; and the third, a serious lack 
of domestic capital with which to launch schemes of economic 
development. Because of these facts the Turks had no idea 
how to participate in a modern economy. In addition they 
had no capital and no precautions were taken by the previous 
state to protect the economy since the basis for a modern 
economy had not yet been formed. 
In the Izmir Economic Congress of 1923 Mahmut Esat 
Bozkurt, the Minister of Economy addressed the delegates and 
paid more attention towards two crucial policy issues at 
1. Omer Celal, "Economic Policy of the New Turkey", in 
The Middle East-Journal, Vol. II, No.4 , 1948, 
pp. 430-31. 
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that time. The first concerned the role of the state in the 
development of the Economy and the second was the role of 
foreign capital in the Turkish Economy. Atatiirk himself 
told the Economic Congress that "We are always ready to give 
the necessary assurances to foreign capital provided it 
" 2 
complies with our laws. 
In the beginning Atatiirk had a suspicious attitude 
towards foreign capital. This is evident from his policies 
and statements of that period. He once pointed out that he 
would welcome the kind of foreign capital that would work 
for the interest of the country. He further admitted that 
the Capital borrowed from the foreign powers could be 
helpful in economic development but could not be the main 
force in the new Turkish economic system. Indeed the main 
3 
support would have to come from internal resources. 
The economic policies for the reconstruction of the 
new Republic known as Etatism was one of the six cardinal 
principles of Kemalism, which Mustafa Kemal laid down as 
being necessary for the birth of the new Turkish nation from 
the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. The principle had its 
origin in the West. It emphasized the necessity of the 
2. Morris Singer, The Economic Advance of Turkey 
1938-1960 (Ankara, 1977), p.45. Cf William Hale, 
The Political and Economical Dev^opment of Modern 
Turkey (London, 1981), p.39-40. 
3. Kenan Bulutoglu, "Atatiirk and his Economic Policy", 
in K.H. Karpat (ed.) Political and Social Thought in 
the Contemporary Middle East (New York,1982), 
p.407-408. 
107 
constructive intervention of the s t a t e in the national 
4 
economy. 
Etatism was adopted in 1933 by the newly formed 
R.P.P. led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk but was officially 
recognized as a central plank of the Turkish economic policy 
in 1935. The Republican Peoples' Party (R.P.P.) adopted it 
as a major policy decision. The constitution was 
conveniently amended to include it in 1937. 
First Five-Year Plan: 
In 1933 the first Turkish five year plan was 
prepared for the expansion of Turkish industry, it was 
approved on January 9, 1934 and completed between 1934 and 
1938. In 1932 a Soviet delegation visited Turkey which was 
headed by Prof. Orlov, who prepared a report proposing the 
establishment of the Industries according to the five-year 
plan. Orlov's report apparently formed the basis of the 
plan which was then adapted. 
4. Huseyin Ramazanoglu, "A Political Analysis of the 
Emergence of Turkish Capitalism, 1839-1950" in H. 
Ramzamo^lu (eds.) Turkey in the World Capitalist 
System (London, 1985), p.54. 
5. Max Weston Thornburg, Turkey, An Economic Appraisal 
(New York, 1949), p.35. 
6. William Hale, The Political and Economj^JDevelopment 
of Modern Turkey, (London, 1981) ^-i?.56. 
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To inaugurate the Etatism and aid from the Soviet 
Union in 1933 Ismet Inon'u Prime Minister, made an official 
visit to Moscow where he signed a comprehensive economic 
agreement between Russia and Turkey. Soviet help, in the 
form of a loan of $ 8 million worth gold without interest, 
was used to finance the five year plan. It was agreed that 
the money was to be used for the purchase of Russian 
machinary and material needed in the programme of 
industrialization. Russia engaged to complete the delivery 
and the necessary techniques to train the Turks. Russian 
ideas and techniques of planning were to be transplanted in 
Turkey. 
Essentially this plan was prepared to establish a 
series of industrial plants designed to reduce Turkey's need 
for imported consumer and intermediate goods using domestic 
raw materials. This plan was inspired by Russian precedent 
and helped through by the Russian loan and advice. The 
first five-year plan was announced keeping in mind a 
simultaneous development of consumer industries chiefly 
textile, hemp, wollen garments, artificial silk, paper, 
glass and porcelain. Producer good industries were to 
include the manufacture of iron, coke and coal by products', 
production of copper and sulphur, chemical industries. Only 
7 
copper and sulphur were to be exported from Turkey.- -
7. Bernard Lewis, Op.cit., p.281 and M.W. Thronburg, 
Qp.cit., p.27. 
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Industrial Development: 
The Industrial Development was the chief aim of 
Turkey's economic planning and the main motive for the 
adaptation of Etatism. 
Ataturk paid special attention towards the 
9 industrial development. He declared, 
"Industrialization is one of 
our chief problems. We shall create 
every industry, big or small, for 
which there are in our land the 
economic conditions necessary for 
its working and development." 
Emphasis was put on the industrialization of the 
backward regions of central and eastern Anatolia. The 
government tried to stimulate private enterprises. Special 
privileges were granted towards establishing sugar 
factories. A law for the encouragement of industries 
provided great facilities for privately owned industrial 
establishments. The emphasis on industrialization is 
8. dmer Celal Sarc; Op.cit., p.4 41 
9. M.W. Thronburg, Op.cit,, p.23. 
10. William Hale, Loc. cit. 
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evident from the Republican party's declaration that private 
enterprises would continue to be fundamental in Turkey's 
economic system. But in order to lead the country, in as 
short a time as possible, to prosperity, the state would 
take an active part in its economic life. The government's 
role would consist of encouragement to private endeavours^ 
of their regulation and supervision and finally of direct 
economic activity by the state. It was to become clear that 
the government was initially ready to allow private enter-
prises which played a major role in the industrial 
development. 
Textile Industry: 
The development of the textile mills was the first 
step towards industrialization. For this purpose the 
government borrowed experts, machinery and equipments from 
12 Germany and Russia on credit for their establishment. 
Private textile factories concentrated largely on 
production of "grey" goods and hand printed cloths in bright 
colours. Both of these items were in great demand. The 
state factories also produced unbleached, bleached, dyed and 
printed cloth. In addition they devoted energies to 
11. Omer Celal Earc, Op.cit., p.433. 
12. Z.Y. Harshlag, Turkey t An Economy in Transition 
(The Hague, Van Keulen, 1958), p.102. 
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produciny more costly woven and printed patterns for urban 
consumption. Private sector also flourished. As in other 
sectors in textile industry too public sector played more 
13 important role than private sector. It however faced 
stiff competition and remained under the continual pressure 
with the state enterprises and was compelled to offer higher 
ways in order to attract workers. Within the textile 
industry efforts continued to increase the production of 
14 
wool, silk and rayon. 
Sugar Industry: 
In 1926 there was no sugar industry in Turkey. 
World War I cut-off the country from foreign supply. The 
price of sugar increased which induced the government to 
encourage rapid growth of the industry. In order to 
increase sugar production not only new sugar plants were 
established but the land area for sugar cane cultivation was 
also enhanced. The first sugar factory was established at 
Usak and the second at Apulia in Thrace. In addition to this 
15 government monopoly was created in sugar imports. 
13. Robert W. Kerwin, "Private Enterprise in Turkish 
Industrial Development" in The Middle East Journal, 
1951, Vol.5, No.l, p.27. 
14. Z.Y. Harshlag, Loc. cit. 
15. Ibid., p.56. 
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In order to promote sugar industry, in 1934, a 
special law was made which stipulated that the sugar 
industry had been exempted from the payment of consumption 
tax for eight years, sugar beet raising was exempted from 
land tax for 10 years on the condition that the best be used 
for industrial purposes also shares to be put on the market 
by sugar manufacturers would be free of profit tax. Other 
concessions were also given in the transport rate of raw 
materials and finished products. 
The growth of the sugar factory had double 
significance. Firstly, the government saved foreign 
exchange which had till then been rising on the import of 
50-70 thousand tons of sugar every year, secondly, by 
increasing the raising of sugar beets for industrial use 
considerable funds - from 5-10 million lira" yearly - were 
diverted to agricultural sector. The industry occasionally 
encountered difficulties arising from small sugar beat 
yields or excessive production costs. Consequently the 
government felt justified in taking over the sugar 
17 
enterprise. 
16. Ibid., pp. 102-103. 
17. Ibid., p.103. 
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Mining: 
The Turkish government had carefully considered the 
importance of mining in the revival of Turkish economy. 
The Institute of Mining, Survey and Research founded by the 
Ministry of Economics, continued to survey the mineral 
wealth of the country and carried out borings in order to 
discover oil or other valuable raw materials, both in 
Anatotia and Thrace. Several schemes were drawn up for the 
expansion in mineral exploitation and for this purpose the 
capital of the Eti Bank, the State agency incharge of mines, 
was increased. Special attention was paid to fully utilize 
the natural resources such as producing coal, lignite, iron 
ore, copper and chrome. In 1936 the government acquired 
the Zunguldak coal mines. Mining and natural resources 
remained largely in the hands of public sector through out 
18 the period of Atatiirk. 
Bank and Finance; 
Ataturk had set up I^ ,Bank (Business Bank) as early 
as 1924 for the purpose to provide financial support for the 
Turkish bourgeoisie to develop business, commerce and 
18. Economic Survey of the Middle East, issued by 
International Islamic Economic Conference -(Karachi, 
n.d.), pp. 107-8. 
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industry. It was publicly controlled but privately owned. 
It had, therefore, a semi-public character. The Board of 
Directors was composed of Deputies in the Assembly, so that 
19 
it would be linked to the governmental programme. It 
played an important role in developing Turkish railways, 
timber, coal, sugar, textile, glass, cement and insurance 
enterprises, co-operating with Siimer Bank in several 
development programmes. 
In 1924 another Bank known as Turk Ticeret Bankasi, 
(Turkish Commercial Bank) was established chiefly with 
private capital. To provide loan for both private and 
public construction and to participate in various commercial 
and industrial enterprises the Real Estate Credit Bank 
(Elmak Kredi Bankasi) was formed with state capital in 1927 
but with 45 per cent of its stock held privately. In 1933 
the provincial Bank (Iller Bankasi) was also founded to 
encourage provincial projects at village and municipal 
20 levels. Later, also, the department of Religious 
Foundation formed its own Vakifler Bankasi (Foundation 
Banks), using income from foundation and private accounts 
to invest in a wide range of enterprises in and out of the 
country. , 
19. M.W. Thronbrug, Op.cit,, p.23. 
20. Huseyin Ramazanoglu, Op^cit., p.63. 
115 
During the 1930s two new development banks were 
established to finance and control the expanding state 
industrial sector. The first of these, Slimer Bank (Sumerian 
bank), in 1933, was established to credit the light and 
heavy industries, and to create new state economic 
enterprises, which were 51 per cent state owned and 
49 per cent privately owned. The production of cotton, 
wool, leather goods, carpets, coke and cement all came under 
state economic enterprises, and these enterprises were 
21 
virtually monopolies in their own market. 
Atatlirk set up the Hittite Bank (Eti Bank) to 
co-ordinate and to develop domestic natural resources for 
productive use. This second state agency was established 
22 
with primary responsibility for the mining industry. 
In order to achieve some protection for industry, 
customs duties were introduced. Later in, 1930, the Central 
Bank of the Turkish Republic (Tlirkeyie Cumhiiriyet Merkezi 
Bankasi) was established with the explicit aim of 
withdrawing the right to control and issue currency from the 
foreign owned Ottoman Bank. The Bank's Head Office was 
established atAnkara. Its manager was appointed by the 
21. Ibid. 
22. William Hale, Op.cit., 57, 
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government and the Board of Directors was elected by the 
23 
Shareholders. 
Agricultural Development: 
Agriculture received greater attention under the 
republic than during the Ottoman Empire. Atatlirk was 
keenly interested in agriculture and had set up a model farm 
on the outskirts of Ankara. Agriculture was the basic 
source of Turkey's economy. Almost four-fifths of the 
people made their living directly or indirectly from 
agriculture. 
Some of the measures taken in favour of agriculture 
were aimed at increasing the income of the peasants. The 
government tried to improve the quality of seeds and 
livestocks, to standardize various products, and to replace 
the wooden plough by the iron one. It fought against plant 
and animal diseases. Some of these measures proved 
successful the number of livestocks grew substantially, the 
quality of certain crops, especially cotton and citrus 
fruits showed marked improvement. The production of wheat, 
which was the basic crop of Turkey, increased. But the basic 
problems of agriculture remained unresolved. Cereal 
23. Z.Y. Harshlag, Op.cit.,p.86. 
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production was highly dependent upon weather. No large-
scale irrigation system was introduced, which remained a big 
24 lacuna m Ataturk's period. 
In 1924 the conscription law was introduced which 
required the army to train conscripts from the villages in 
the use of machines and new cultivation techniques in the 
course of their military service. 
The village law encouraged the use of scientific 
methods and provided means to instruct the cultivators on 
improving their living standards and develop useful home-
industries. The Ministry of Agriculture functioned 
effectively and provided agricultural training and advice 
about the new crops, methods and scientific machines. The 
Ministry also granted the exemption from custom duties for 
25 imported equipments. 
In 1937 a four-year plan was formulated for the 
purpose of development of agriculture, including technical 
improvements, afforestation, intensification of agricultural 
exports (in co-operation with second Five-Year Plan) and 
implementation of irrigation and other water schemes. In 
the latter chief consideration was given to the supply of 
drinking water to the cities. Agricultural experts were 
24. bmer Celal Sarc, Op.cit., pp. 438-40. 
25. S.J.Shaw & E.K.Shaw, Op.cit., p.388. 
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sent to Europe and America to learn new methods and 
techniques. An Agriculture school was opened at Ankara 
which later become a part of the Ankara University. 
Infrastructure and Transportation: 
Infrastructure and means of goods transportation is 
a fundamental requirement for the growth of an economy. 
Atatiirk was well aware of this fact. It was, therefore, 
from the very beginning that he paid special attention 
towards the development of infrastructure. Considerable 
funds went in for the development of transportation such as 
27 
railways, highways, shipping and airways. 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
the basic improvement in economic infrastructure had been 
made in railway construction, but even this was effectively 
limited to Western Anatolia. The only railway line that 
existed in Turkey was what was known as Baghdad Railway. 
From Istanbul it ran through Konya, Adna and Mosul (in Iraq) 
with a branch to Ankara and another to Izmir. Most parts of 
Central and Eastern Anatolia remained without modern 
28 
communication. Soon a f t e r the new Republ ican government 
26. Z.Y. Harshlag , O p . c i t . , p . 1 1 1 . 
27. The Economy of Turkey, sponsored by International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Batliraore, 
1951), pp. 121-22. 
28. William Hale, Op.cit., p.36. 
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took over it launched an aggressive programme of the 
construction of railway line. It constructed more than 
3000 kilometres of railway line within a few years. 
Turkey's road system recieved relatively little 
attention, and remained far less adequate than the railway 
network. From 1923 to 1928 the Ministry of Public Works 
assumed the supervision of road expansions and maintenance. 
The government provided the foreign exchange necessary to 
import commercial vehicles of the type and weight 
30 
appropriate for Turkey's roads. 
In the related field of sea transport the Lausanne 
treaty had allowed Turkey to reserve coastel shipping for 
her own vessels and a law to this effect was passed in 1926. 
Trade, however, remained mainly in the private sector, 
until the 1930's. Private owners, neglecting unprofitable 
lines, so competed amongst themselves for the profitable 
ones that freight rates fell sharply. This led the 
government to bring all private shipowners within a single 
corporation. Later, in 1935, the state acquired a monopoly 
of scheduled lines and of the transport of passangers, so 
that private operators were then limited to tramp 
navigation and to the transport of merchandise. 
29. The Economy of Turkey, p.123, 
30. Ibid., pp. 126-127. 
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Turkish State airlines, organized in 1937, has 
31 
monopoly of civil aviation m Turkey. 
31. M.W. Throubury, Op.cit., p.90 
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CHAPTER - VIII 
REVOLUTIONISM (Inkilap^ilik) 
Revolutionism is the last of the six basic 
principles of Kemalism. Although this principle was 
adopted officially as late as in 1935, but this had been an 
everpresent notion of Kemalist ideology from the very 
beginning. Revolution can best be described as the zeal and 
fervour with which Kemal Atatlirk began his campaign of the 
reconstruction of the Turkish Society and Policy. But the 
element of revolution can be tranced even before Mustafa 
Kemal began his programme of reconstruction and reform. 
To be exact the element of Revolutionism can be traced back 
to the days when Atatiirk began his military campaigns. 
1. It has been mentioned that the army in Turkey had 
been in the past the main factor in modernization 
and political change. The army still continues to 
symbolize and promote modernization, technical 
innovations are easily introduced ; it provides 
education for illiterates t army officers in various 
towns throughout Turkey live according to the modern 
conception of life (they are generally secularized) 
and this provides a model which is followed there. 
This is particularly true in large centres where 
there are increased opportunities for work. In 
smaller towns the army provided free education, a 
career, and chances for a better living. See K.H. 
Karpat, Op.cit., p.341. 
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It was the spirit of Revolution that promoted Atatiirk and 
his colleagues and followers to phunge themselves into the 
affairs. 
Though unspoken and not clearly defined before the 
1930's, Revolutionism served as a cardinal and inherent 
principle in the Kemalist programme of reform and 
reconstruction. After it was adopted officially as the 
sixth principle it was defined as the fundamental philosophy 
of change and reform as well as a guarantee to all of the 
aims and reforms of Kemalism. A prominent scholar of 
Kemalist ideology defines Revolutionism as the philosophical 
basis of change that is "the determination to change and 
bypass tradition and precedent if they do not serve the 
2 
national purpose." It was this principle that was the 
philosophy guarantee and source of the future hopes of the 
five other principles. The spirit of Revolutionism "was the 
readiness, even zeal, to transform the traditional Ottoman 
society into a modern one by radical, forced measures, 
aimed at achieving success within a span of a single 
3 
generation". 
2. S.J. Shaw and E.K. Fhaw, Op.cit., p.384. 
3. Ibid. 
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About Revolutionism another scholar writes that it 
"explains the new understanding of Turkey". 
The accumulated effect of the principle combined 
4 
together is to supply a social value of the whole. Mustafa 
Kemal's own concepts regarding revolutionism are reflected 
in his own definition when he says : 
"It is a natural and eternal result 
of the revolutionary principles that 
life is considered to be based on the 
requirements of the world and on that 
alone." 
Another important feature of revolutionism was that 
it provided guarantee to sustain and preserve other 
objectives of the kemalist programme of reform. 
Revolutionism then meant that the process of the revolution 
v\70uld continued to be a permanent trait of the course of 
events under the republican regime. Such a pretentius, if 
not dangerous, principle may sound senseless to observers. 
We know that enunciation of the six principles was a by 
product of the desire to try lay down the principles which 
would be distinguishing the Kemalists ideology from those 
4. Enver Ziya Karal, Op.cit., p.28 
5. Ibid., p.23. 
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of the major Western ideologies, namely, liberalism, facism, 
and communism, which were currently occupying the interests 
of intellectuals and politicians in the 1930's. 
Revolutionism flourished first with the development of these 
principles. It takes into consideration the undoubted fact 
that every revolution is followed by a counter-revolution 
and so it is persistent in holding on to the targets reached 
by the revolution. Ataturk's indication of the vitality of 
7 the principles is as follows; 
"The source of prosperity and superiority for the 
nation today, just as it was yesterday and will be tomorrow, 
is the reform of principles." 
Upto the time when a newly coined word for 
revolution, devrim, took the place of these two words' 
ikhtilal and Inkilab, they had had a long history in the 
Ottoman Turkish political vocabulary. Their latest meaning 
v\7ere formed only after 1908, before the introduction of the 
6. Niyazi Berkes, "The Two Facets of the Kemalist 
Revolution", in The Muslim World, 1974, Vol.LXIV, 
No.4, p.293. 
Enver Ziya Karal, Op.cit., p.23. 
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word devrim. The revolution of 1908 was, neither a 
revolution nor a reform. It was a coup. The 1908 revolution 
was likely to bring some political change, the real need was 
for an inkijab rather than an Ikhtilal . They deposed the 
ruler, overthrew his government, called the parliament, 
formed political parties and went to election. This 
revolution appeared to have brought a full-fledged 
constitutional regime into operation, though the critics 
still were not satisfied. They kept stressing that the 
Revolution had failed in being revolutionary - that is. 
8. The Republicans used in their programme the newly 
invented word deverimcilik for reformism which is 
defined as a means to dispose of the country's 
backwardness and to replace it with an advance 
civilization based on national values and promised 
to strive incessantly to achieve this goal and to 
preserve the reforms accompished (Article 16). 
Later this word was used by the Democratic who 
preserved it by the old name, inkiiapcilik that 
defined as an effort to adjust life in Turkey to the 
World's changing conditions and to achieve progress 
by disposing of harmful traditions (Article 15). 
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it had failed in opening the gates for genuine radical 
social reforms. The respective meanings of ikhtilal and 
inkilab gained a certain clarity. In spite of this, the 
two words, which referred to two different processes of 
change, continued to be used indiscriminately and inter-
changeably to cover the Western term 'revolution'. 
The so-called revolutionary period of 1908-18 was 
more a period of inkilab than of ikhtilal because 
practically all of the ideas which later became the bases 
of Kemalist reforms were formulated then, and a few of them 
had even been implemented, at least partially and not 
without hesitation. In other words, one of the facets of 
Kemalist revolutionism was achieving the ikhtilal, which 
9 
could not have been conceived of between 1908 and 1918. 
A brief review of the evolution of the meaning of 
the two words may help us to get a better perspective of the 
two facets of the Turkish revolution. During the 17th and 
18th centuries, both terms bore definite meaning which were 
almost exact opposites of what they assumed after 1908. 
This is reflected in the revolution of the attitudes behind 
9. Niyazi Berkes, Op.cit., p.294. 
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their respective meanings, from negative to positive. 
The year 1909 was a turning point in the revival of 
the old concepts of ikhtilal and inkilab, after a period of 
eclipse, as political terms with totally reversed meaning. 
Ikhtilal meant seizure of power by force. The 1909 siezure 
of power sealed the fate of Ottoman sovereignty, it never 
recovered from the blow and few cared for its everlasting 
potency. Attention turned towards other targets, the 
problems of inkilab, social transformation or moderni-
zation. The period following 1909 was one of confron-
tation between those who proposed radical ideas or 
civilizational transformation but without having 
revolutionary power or desire and those with power but 
lacking revolutionary orientation with respect to the 
problem of civilization. 
Confrontation with two major problems from 1919 to 
12 1923 was the beginning of the two facets. The origins of 
the two facets of the revolution, thus go back to two 
10. Ibid., p.295. 
11. Ibid., p.300. 
12. Ibid., p.301. 
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divergent interpretations of the aims of the struggle for 
independence under Mustafa Kemal's leadership. 
After having achieved an ikhtilal by overthrowing 
the sultanate, Kemalism turned to initiating a process 
ofsuccessive inkilab . As already mentioned, the political 
ikhtilal was clearly a prerequisite for initiation of this 
14 process. The treaty of Lausanne again symbolized the 
relation between the two facets. World powers recognized 
the independent sovereignty of Turkey not as an Ottoman 
state but as a nation-state free from any form of 
international control or mandate. 
The principle of r'=^ vol utioni sm cannot be evaluated 
without the two basic features found in it which do not 
accompany all non-Western nationalist ideologies. One 
feature is secularism, the other is a particular view of 
13. Ibid., p.302. 
14. Turkey pledged the initiation of a series of drastic 
changes in her constitutional, judicial, educational 
and cultural institutions, each one of which can be 
found in various provisions of the Treaty which 
again reciprocally, recognized the freedom of the 
choices to be exercised in their implementation by 
whichever regime its people would consent to. 
15. Ibid., p.304. 
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the problem of modernization of "backward" nations. Both 
emerged from the experience of the struggles against the 
ideologies waged inside the country and of those directed 
against the imperialist powers. That the Turkish struggle 
for national liberation was one of this nature is a well 
known and generally accepted fact. Such struggle was even 
predicted before 1918. 
This is a point that differentiates his anti-
imperialism from several similar ones, and the significance 
of the principle of revolutionism to be found here. One of 
the points which he emphasized in his speeches after the 
termination of the war of independence was the warning that 
by sticking of turning to their obsolete traditions and 
by thus allowing themselves to be exploited, the under-
developed nations themselves carried the higher measure of 
responsibility for their backwardness. To bridge the gap 
and reach the point of self-supported uplift, they had to 
organize and mobilize themselves for an entirely new kind of 
17 battle for existence. 
Few national leaders would dare to challenge the 
nation to rid itself of its cherished beliefs and maintain 
16. Ibid., p.304. 
17. Ibid., p.305. 
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what the principle of revolutionary spirit implied. 
Understanding the meaning of the spirit of revolutionism, 
therefore, depends greatly upon seeing the implications of 
the interrelationship between the two facets - one 
concerning the problem of national independence the other 
concerning the problems of the spirit of modernization as 
the pre-condition upon which the first could be carried out 
and advanced. 
18. Ibid., p.306. 
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C O N C L U S I O N S 
Kemalism and Kemalist Principles are products of the 
Turkish revolution, which occurred in the years following 
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and is named after the 
leader of the movement, Mustafa Kemal Atatlirk. The term, 
'Kemalism' as such was first used by the Western authors. 
Later in Turkey Ataturkculuk, was referred to as Kemalist 
Principles. 
Kemal Atatiirk, the founder of Modern Turkey 
represents a class by himself. He used every opportunity 
that came his way to study the age old Greek concept of 
State with the practical appreciation of these in his times, 
besides other ideas that were taking practical shape in 
Europe. Though he did not give a manual description of the 
principles which to the modern world are known as 
'Principles of Kemalism' the same can be gathered from his 
speeches and his successful implementation of the same. 
Mustafa Kemal's secular views did not differ much 
from those of the radical members of the Young Turks but he 
was able to develop a pattern of thought peculiar to 
himself, therefore, his reforms remained unparalelled as 
compared to the Westernization procedures implemented in 
Turkey since the reign of Sultan Selim III. 
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There is no doubt about the fact that Mustafa Kemal 
has yiven a new direction and a new ideology to Turkey and 
her people. He thought that the purpose of State was 
protection and development of a political society. He 
emphasised that the aim of the reforms was to change the 
Turkish society into a modern one. He gave a new definition 
to ethnicity and nation : The Turkish nation are those who 
live in Turkey irresputure of religion, ethenicity or race. 
He laid special emphasis on the right of the people to 
develop the country. Similarly he introduced and developed 
the concept of sovereignty meaning thereby that sovereignty 
belongs to the people as against the Ottoman Constitution 
wherein it belonged to the members of the Ottoman family and 
the Turks were either turned as Ottomans or Mohammadans. 
He laid stress upon the concept of homeland by which he 
meant the land inhabited by the Turks having their own 
culture, art and literature and in particular language. 
Moreover, he referred to the terms "Halk" for Turkish people 
as against millet used by the Ottomans. Furthermore, he 
stressed that it were the people who were the sources of 
democratic rights. 
Atatlirk was aware of the problem created by the 
commercial liberalism prevailing in the European neighbour-
hood where individuals with little bargaining power deprived 
the rightful use of the means of production. He was 
convinced that State had to play some role in the 
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development of economy to protect its people from within and 
without. Thus the principle known as Etatism. 
The fifth, and probably the most important, 
principle, upon which the foundations of Modern Turkey were 
laid, is Secularism. Though its origins can be traced in 
the West, it was extensively developed and applied by Kemal 
Atatlirk. He believed that religion had no role in the 
administration of the State, it was but of individual 
concern. He declared that the government was materialistic. 
He, therefore, liberated the legislative executive and 
judiciary from religious influences. 
Finally, Ataturk believed in Revolutionism as an 
ideology and as a guarantee and source of hope for Turkey's 
future. 
Ataturk had clear vision as to the formulation of a 
State based on scientific principles. However, at the same 
time it will not be out of place to mention here that in 
his overzeal to discard religion he probably crossed limits. 
As it has come to transpire now that religion remained an 
important means to uphold the moral standards of the people. 
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